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Abstract 
The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) recently issued the landmark decision in 
Interpretation No. 748 (the Same-Sex Marriage Case), declaring the definition of marriage 
as a gender-differentiated union of a man and a woman under the Civil Code 
unconstitutional and setting the stage for Taiwan becoming the first country in Asia to 
legalize same-sex marriage. The Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case has thus been 
compared to Obergefell v. Hodges. Reading it in light of the broad context of gay rights 
movement and the role of judicial review in Taiwanese constitutional politics, we challenge 
the Obergefell analogy. Instead, it is Brown v. Board of Education that provides the better 
lens through which the Same-Sex Marriage Case is to be read. We argue that due to the 
discrepancy between the social movement and the law in the fight for the constitutional 
rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan, the Same-Sex Marriage Case marks Taiwan’s Brown, 
not Obergefell, moment in her constitutional law and politics. To make sense of the law and 
politics of the Same Sex Marriage Case, we take account of its political context and its text 
and style in its reasoning. Of the broader political context of the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
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we observe that there is discrepancy between law and politics in the pursuit for the 
constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan. The rise of same-sex marriage to the 
top of the antidiscrimination agenda resulted from the continuous effort of gay rights 
activists, whereas the TCC watched the gay rights movement from the sidelines until the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case. Preconditioned by the discrepancy between law and politics in the 
constitutional protection of the rights of gays and lesbians, the Same-Sex Marriage Case thus 
mirrors Brown in two senses. First, the role of the TCC has been publicly questioned 
because of the Brown-like contentious decision on the issue of same-sex marriage. Second, 
the text and style of the Same-Sex Marriage Case is evocative of the exceptional brevity, 
managed unanimity, and scientific rationality in Brown. Echoing the Brown Court, the TCC 
attempts to manage judicial legitimacy, which it expects will have been confronted by the 
political reaction to its ruling in light of its opening intervention in gay rights issues by 
tackling the fundamental question of same-sex marriage head-on, through judicial style in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Case.  
  
 
Table of Contents 	
I.	 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 3	
II.	 THE PATH TOWARDS THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASE .................... 8	
A.	 AN UNMOVED COURT IN THE BREAKING OF A POLITICAL TABOO: 1986-2000  ... 10	
B.	 THE ABSENT CONSTITUTIONAL VOICE IN MARRIAGE EQUALITY: 2001-2015 ...... 12	
C.	 THE SOUGHT-AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDANCE IN THE LAST MILE: 2016-- .... 17	
III.	 THE SHADOW OF (GREATER) OBERGEFELL ....................................... 23	
A.	 DOCTRINE ............................................................................................................. 23	
B.	 PRINCIPLE ............................................................................................................. 33	
IV.	 IT’S BROWN, NOT OBERGEFELL ............................................................... 39	
A.	 MANAGING LEGITIMACY THROUGH JUDICIAL STYLE ........................................... 41	
1.	“We could all actually read it if we wanted to” ................................................ 41	
2.	“Having only two was unusual and awkward” ................................................. 53	
3.	“Believing in the power of science as the deliverer of final truths” ................. 64	
B.	 JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY IN THE LIMELIGHT ............................................................ 74	
V.	 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 81	
 
 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2017, the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC)1 issued a landmark decision 
on the rights of gays and lesbians in Interpretation No. 748.2 In this Interpretation (the Same 
Sex Marriage Case), the TCC declared the current provisions of the Taiwanese Civil Code 
that govern the marriage institution unconstitutional for essentially restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.3 By means of a suspended remedial order, the TCC effectively held up 
the foregoing declaration of unconstitutionality until after two years from the date of the 
decision, allowing the Legislative Yuan (the Parliament) time to sort out the required legal 
framework for same-sex marriage. Anticipating that the required legislation might be stalled 
in the parliamentary procedures with the two-year clock running out, the TCC further 
decreed that should the Parliament fail to legislate same-sex marriage, the current Civil Code 
would then be extended to same-sex couples who wish to enter into marriage, despite the 
family structure being institutionally conceived according to the model of opposite-sex 
marriage.4 Through this landmark decision, the TCC has paved the way for the legalization 
                                                
1 The official designation of the TCC is the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan (the Council of 
Grand Justices). Yet the TCC has become what the Council of Gran Justices is known to the public and its 
observers. We shall come back to this point infra text accompanying notes 222-32. The Judicial Yuan is the 
umbrella governing body of judicial administration, which is one of the five highest constitutional powers 
under Taiwan’s quintpartite separation of powers system. The other four powers are the Legislative Yuan 
(Legislature or Parliament), the Executive Yuan (the National Administration), the Control Yuan 
(Ombudsmanship) as well as the Examination Yuan. For an introduction to the judicial organization in Taiwan, 
see generally Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: Gradual Transformations towards the 
Guardian of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 143, 145-51 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & 
Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014). 
2 Interpretation No. 748 (2017), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01_1.asp?expno=748. 
A detailed press release in English can be downloaded at 
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/GNNWS/NNWSS002.asp?id=267570. All the references to the TCC case law are 
based on its original Chinese version made available on the TCC official website at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03.asp. Unless specified otherwise, all English renderings in 
this Article are ours to make them more readable. As the TCC is organically part of the Judicial Yuan (J.Y.), 
the TCC decision is formally styled as J.Y. Interpretation. For the purpose of elegance, we simply refer to the 
official case report as Interpretation with its serial number. Also, formally speaking, the TCC’s decision takes 
the form of interpretation. As its interpretations result from referrals or petitions prompted by constitutional or 
other legal disputes, the TCC effectively rules on disputes through interpretations. Thus, we use 
“interpretation,” “ruling,” “judgment,” and “decision” interchangeably when referring to the TCC case law. 
3 Interpretation No 748, supra note 2. 
4 Id; see also Ming-Sung Kuo & Hui-Wen Chen, Responsibility and Judgment in a Muted 3-D Dialogue: A 
Primer on the Same-Sex Marriage Case in Taiwan, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, May 26, 2017, 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/05/responsibility-and-judgment-in-a-muted-3-d-dialogue-a-primer-on-thesa
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of same-sex marriage in Taiwan. 
The Same-Sex Marriage Case is historic indeed. Not only does it add Taiwan to the few 
jurisdictions where same-sex marriage is legally recognized through judicial ruling,5 it also 
blazes the trail for marriage equality for same-sex couples in Asia.6 That is a truly 
remarkable development as it shows how far Taiwan has moved away from a traditional 
patriarchal Confucian society under a quasi-military dictatorship to one of the most tolerant, 
liberal countries in the world over the past three decades. The Same-Sex Marriage Case 
testifies to the transcendental value of antidiscrimination. Antidiscrimination and marriage 
equality are no longer part of the hegemony of Western constitutionalism but rather open 
new frontiers in Asia.7  
Though the Same-Sex Marriage Case has been praised as the Taiwanese version of 
Obergefell v. Hodges,8 it is no less controversial than other ground-breaking judicial rulings 
of various jurisdictions around the globe. At the outset, it is worth noting that the same-sex 
marriage issue has long been at the center of Taiwanese gay rights movement and the 
rallying call for its opposition.9 Since its promulgation, the Same-Sex Marriage Case has 
prompted intense political reactions and raucous social counter-mobilization.10 It is surely 
too early to forecast how the forthcoming legalization of same-sex marriage will pan out 
                                                                                                                                                 
me-sex-marriage-case-in-taiwan.  
5 See Daniel Toda Castán, Marriage Equality and the German Federal Constitutional Court: The Time for 
Comparative Law, VERFBLOG, July 11, 2017, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/marriage-equality-and-the-german-federal-constitutional-court-the-time-for-comparat
ive-law/, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170711-120227 (listing the TCC among the constitutional courts 
or supreme courts of South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, and the United States with respect to the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriage by judicial review). 
6 See., e.g., Chris Horton, Court Ruling Could Make Taiwan First Place in Asia to Legalize Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2017, at A6.  
7 See, e.g., Emily Rauhala, In Historic Decision, Taiwanese Court Rules in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage, 
WASH. POST, May 24, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-milestone-decision-taiwan-court-rules-in-favor-of-same-sex-marria
ge/2017/05/24/bf7aa370-405b-11e7-9851-b95c40075207_story.html?utm_term=.3b4606f3979a.  
8 576 U.S. ___; 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Cf. Geoffrey Yeung, First in Asia – Taiwan’s Marriage Equality 
Ruling in Comparative and Queer Perspectives, OXHRH BLOG, July 6, 2017, 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/first-in-asia-taiwans-marriage-equality-ruling-in-comparative-and-queer-perspectives 
(emphasizing the “notable similarities between the reasoning of [the Same-Sex Marriage Case] and that of 
…Obergefell v. Hodges). 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part IV.B. 
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amidst the post-ruling politics in Taiwan. We do not have the crystal ball for it and that is not 
what we intend in this Article. Nevertheless, we are certain that the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
is destined for greatness in the world of comparative constitutional law and politics. Thus, in 
this Article, we aim to make sense of the law and politics of the Same-Sex Marriage Case in 
light of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) so that its 
historic meaning in comparative constitutionalism can be duly appreciated. The Same-Sex 
Marriage Case deserves close study for two further reasons. First, it enriches the 
understanding of the possibility and limitation of the court’s role in facilitating fundamental 
changes on the marriage institution. Outside the United States, only South Africa, and a 
number of jurisdictions in Canada and Latin America ushered in same-sex marriage through 
judicial decisions before the TCC joined the list.11 The pool of activist judicial genes, if you 
will, in this regard was very small. Taiwan’s addition not only increases the number of 
examples in the general studies of the court-driven legalization of same-sex marriage but will 
also augment the genetic diversity as it provides an example of judicial engineering of the 
marriage institution from East Asia.  
Second, the Same-Sex Marriage Case prefigures a foundational shift in comparative 
studies of the legitimacy of judicial review in Taiwan. It has been argued that the TCC 
metamorphosed from a weakling under the martial-law rule into a strong court through a 
series of bootstrapping rulings on separation of power issues, smoothing the way for 
Taiwan’s transition to constitutional democracy.12 The TCC set itself apart from other 
constitutional courts and the equivalent by pivoting its legitimacy more on the steering of 
politically charged inter-departmental conflicts than on the protection of fundamental 
rights.13 We hasten to add that the TCC has been a reliable and consistent guardian of 
                                                
11 See Castán, supra note 5; Peter W. Hogg, Canada: The Constitution and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 712, 715-16 (2006) (discussing the role of the Canadian Supreme Court and provincial courts in the 
legalization of same-sex marriage). 
12 For the meaning of bootstrapping in this context, see Ming-Sung Kuo, Moving towards a Nominal 
Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections on the Shift from Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in 
Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 597, 604 (2016); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, 
Bootstrapping, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 116-17 (2012) (defining the concept of bootstrapping). 
13 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 30 (2004). 
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fundamental rights since the early days of democratization. Our point here is that the TCC 
has been more a trend follower than a trailblazer in the protection of fundamental rights and 
it is in the politics of interdepartmental conflicts that the TCC has engaged in bootstrapping 
and thus given itself legitimacy.14 Yet, given the highly contentious character of the debate 
over same-sex marriage, the Same-Sex Marriage Case foreshadows a point of departure, 
putting the TCC’s role in fundamental rights issues and its legitimacy to the test. Viewed 
thus, the Same-Sex Marriage Case brings fresh perspectives to comparative studies of the 
legitimacy of judicial review. 
Our thesis is that due to the discrepancy between the social movement and the law in 
the fight for the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan, the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case marks Taiwan’s Brown,15 not Obergefell, moment in her constitutional law and 
politics. In terms of subject, doctrine, and argument, the Same-Sex Marriage Case mirrors 
Obergefell. Yet a closer look will suggest otherwise. To make sense of the law and politics 
of the Same Sex Marriage Case, it is necessary not only to consider its broader political 
context but also to take account of the text and the style of judicial reasoning. What is 
characteristic of its broader political context is the discrepancy between law and politics in 
the pursuit for the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan. The rise of same-sex 
marriage to the top of the antidiscrimination agenda resulted from the continuous effort of 
gay rights activists, whereas the TCC watched the gay rights movement from the sidelines 
until the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Though it is apparent that the immediate politics 
following the Same-Sex Marriage Case is reminiscent of Brown,16 we shall further argue 
that preconditioned by the discrepancy between law and politics in the constitutional 
protection of the rights of gays and lesbians, the Same-Sex Marriage Case turns out to be 
                                                
14 See generally Chien-Chih Lin, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Case of Taiwan, 9 N.T.U. L. REV. 103 
(2014); cf. Kuo, supra note 12, at 598-601 (alluding to the TCC’s focus on separation of powers issues in the 
stage of democratic transition). 
15 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
16 E.g., Jerome A. Cohen, What Taipei’s Same-Sex Ruling Can Teach China, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 
May 29, 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2096077/taiwans-landmark-ruling-same-sex-marriage-h
ighlights-gulf; Chien-Chih Lin, Analysis: J.Y. Interpretation No. 748, The Same-Sex Marriage Case in Taiwan, 
BLOG OF IACL, AIDC, July 2, 2017, 
https://iacl-aidc-blog.org/2017/07/02/analysis-j-y-interpretation-no-748-the-same-sex-marriage-case-in-taiwan/.  
 7 
Brown-esque through and through: Not only the post-ruling politics but also the judicial 
style17 of the Same-Sex Marriage Case is evocative of the exceptional brevity, managed 
unanimity, and scientific rationality in Brown. Echoing the Brown Court, the TCC attempts 
to manage judicial legitimacy, which it expects will have been confronted by the political 
reaction to its ruling in light of its opening intervention in gay rights issues by tackling the 
fundamental question of same-sex marriage head-on, through judicial style in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case.  
Our argument is structured as follows. Following Introduction (Part I), we recap the 
prehistory and history of the Same-Sex Marriage Case in Part II. Apart from providing a 
summary account of the petitions leading to the consolidated ruling in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case, we shall situate the decision in its political prehistory, which goes all the 
way back to the inception of gay rights movement in the 1980s when one of the petitioners, 
Mr. Chia-Wei Chi,18 raised the issue of same-sex marriage for the first time in Taiwanese 
history. With its (pre)historical context revealed, we take a close look at the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case in Part III. We shall argue that its doctrinal framework and underlying legal 
principle suggest a certain parallelism with Obergefell, despite the TCC’s practice of 
unattributed reference.19 In Part IV, we depart from the digest of doctrine and principle for 
an analysis of the unusual judicial style of the Same-Sex Marriage Case in light of the TCC’s 
conventional practice. We shall discuss why the Same-Sex Marriage Case marks the Brown, 
not Obergefell, moment in the TCC history, suggesting that Taiwan will be entering a new 
constitutional law and politics as the legitimacy of the TCC comes into the limelight. We 
conclude in Part V that the discrepancy between law and politics in the constitutional fight 
for the equal rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan inevitably preconditions the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case and thus turns it into the TCC’s Brown moment.   
 
                                                
17 For the meaning of judicial style, see Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, 
Britain and the U. S. A., 24 AM. J. COMP. L 43 (1976). 
18 Surnames of all the Taiwanese authors cited in this Article and the interested parties in the debate 
surrounding same-sex marriage in Taiwan are placed behind their given names. 
19 See infra text companying notes 172-73. 
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II. THE PATH TOWARDS THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASE 
The consolidated Same-Sex Marriage Case results from two separate constitutional 
petitions to the TCC in regard to the legal definition of marriage. At the core of the 
constitutional controversy is article 972 of the Civil Code, which governs the agreement to 
marry.20 Though the Civil Code provides for no definition of marriage, it does refer to “male 
and female” as the contracting parties to the required agreement to marry prior to entering 
into marriage in the foregoing Agreement to Marry Provision. And an agreement to marry 
had long been interpreted as being contracted between a male and a female, resulting in the 
legal recognition of heterosexual marriage only. Against this background arose the 
constitutional petitions leading to the Same-Sex Marriage Case.  
The first petitioner in the Same-Sex Marriage Case is the Taipei Municipal 
Government (TMG). Under a newly elected mayor who had run as an independent,21 the 
TMG collided with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice (of the Executive 
Yuan, the National Administration) over the constitutionality of the Agreement to Marry 
Provision. The long-held official position was that the Agreement to Marry Provision as 
interpreted above raised no constitutional issues under the constitutional provision of general 
freedom of action (article 22) or equal protection (article 7).22 The TMG differed. As the 
statutory municipality entrusted with the remit of marriage registration, the TMG requested 
the Ministry of the Interior to refer the dispute to the TCC in July 2015 and the National 
                                                
20 The Civil Code article 972 provides, “An agreement to marry shall be made between the male and female 
contracting parties thereto of their own volition.” To show why that provision in its Chinese original is 
ambiguous, we adopt our own translation as indicated above instead of subscribing to the English version 
available at the official website of the Ministry of Justice, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=B0000001.  
21 See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
22 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 2. See THE ROC (TAIWAN) CONSTITUTION article 7, “All citizens 
of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the 
law” and article 22, “All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or 
public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution,” available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000001. Notably, the official position was 
indicated for the first time in an interpretive circular of 1994 issued by the Ministry of Justice resulting from the 
second petitioner of the consolidated Same-Sex Marriage Case, Mr. Chia-Wei Chi’s meeting with the Ministry 
of the Interior in 1994. Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8. For the background of that interpretive 
circular, see infra text and accompanying notes 30-31. 
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Administration later obliged in November of the same year.23 The second petitioner is Mr. 
Chia-Wei Chi. As suggested in Part I, Mr. Chi is a veteran activist in the gay rights 
movement in Taiwan and had petitioned the Parliament for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage as early as 1986.24 Continuing his fight for marriage equality and other rights for 
gays and lesbians, he applied to a household agency for marriage registration with a man 
other than his partner again in 2013.25 After that latest unsuccessful attempt,26 Mr. Chi took 
his case to the Taipei High Administrative Court (THAC). Eventually the case worked its 
way through the two-tier judicial review of agency adjudication in 2014 and Mr. Chi 
petitioned the TCC to intervene in August, 2015. The TCC admitted these two petitions in 
November and December, 2016, respectively. 
The two constitutional petitions leading to the consolidated ruling in the Same Sex 
Marriage Case raise intriguing questions: Why did the TMG suddenly dispute the Ministry 
of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice in 2015 in regard to the constitutionality of the 
Agreement to Marry Provision? Was it simply the new mayor’s one-man initiative? Was it 
part of a progressive agenda or the product of a calculating political move? Why did Mr. Chi 
wait almost one year before launching his constitutional fight instead of petitioning the TCC 
immediately following the Supreme Administrative Court’s (SAC) rejection of his appeal in 
September 2014? The answers to these questions hold the key to making sense of the Same 
Sex Marriage Case. Yet, to answer these questions, we need to rewind the case history a bit 
                                                
23 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 1. The National Administration made the referral on behalf of its 
subordinate Ministry of the Interior in accordance with the Constitutional Litigation Procedure Act (CIPA) 
article 5 section 1 paragraph 1. CIPA, http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030159 (in 
Chinese). 
24 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8; Chia-Wei Chi (祁家威), Zheng Qu Tong Xing Lian Hun Pei 
Ren Quan De Man Man Chang Lu (爭取同性戀婚配人權的漫漫長路) [The Long Struggle for Same-Sex 
Couples’ Right to Marriage], in Da Fa Guan, Bu Gei Shuo Fa! (大法官, 不給說法!) [JUSTICES, NO 
COMMENT!] 205, 207 (Min Jian Si Fa Gai Ge Ji Jin Hui (民間司法改革基金會) [Judicial Reform Foundation] 
ed., 2011). The fact alone belies the proposition that the marriage equality movement in Taiwan was born out of 
Taiwan’s more recent Diverse Families movement. For that proposition, see Yeung, supra note 8.  
25 The amendment of the Civil Code, which had been passed in May, 2007, abolished ceremonial marriage 
in May, 2008 when it came into effect. Registration with the household agency has since become a requirement 
for a marriage to be legally recognized instead. For Mr. Chi’s first attempt to marry a man under the Civil 
Code, see infra text accompanying notes 35-36.  
26 Mr. Chi also applied for the officiation of marriage with a man under the old Civil Code and petitioned 
the TCC to intervene in September, 2000. In a summary decision of May 2001, his petition was dismissed on 
grounds of admissibility. See Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8.  
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and bring its political prehistory to the fore. We divide constitutional politics of the same-sex 
marriage issue and the changing role of the TCC in it in three periods (1986-2000, 
2001-2015, and 2016--) and discuss how they are interrelated in each period in order.  
A. An Unmoved Court in the Breaking of a Political Taboo: 1986-2000  
Calls for the legalization of same-sex marriage can be traced back to the mid-1980s 
when democratization in Taiwan was just setting out, indicating that the antidiscrimination 
movement and the rights of gays and lesbians have long been on the agenda of the civil 
rights movement and the political reform. As noted above, Mr. Chi, the pioneer of the gay 
rights movement, petitioned the Parliament, which was still filled with parliamentarians 
elected in China in 1948,27 to legalize same-sex marriage in 1986, the year before the lifting 
of martial law in Taiwan. The Parliament responded hatefully that homosexuals were only 
minority and all perverts, who broke the conventional morality to the satisfaction of their 
own sexual desire.28 That was not the end of the Mr. Chi affair with his legislative petition 
for recognizing same-sex marriage. Soon after the Parliament’s rejection of his petition, he 
was detained with political prisoners without charge for five months.29 
Notably, though Mr. Chi was the trailblazer of the gay rights movement in Taiwan, the 
legalization of same-sex marriage was not the only issue about gay rights in his mind. And 
his approach to pursuing the equal rights of gays and lesbians by raising the issue of 
same-sex marriage was not shared by all the gay rights activists. Thus, following his historic 
petition in 1986, the focus of gay rights movement was on more immediate concerns of gays 
and lesbians such as the prohibition of discrimination against AIDS patients and the end of 
                                                
27 Despite a number of elected parliamentarians being added to the 1948 Parliament after the first 
parliamentary election in Taiwan in 1969, most of the seats were occupied by those elected in China in 1948 
until 1991. See Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of Fatung: Representational Manipulation and Reconstruction in 
Taiwan, in THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVE: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 23 (Graham 
Hassall and Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997). We shall discuss the issues surrounding the 1948 Parliament further 
infra text accompanying notes 367-71.  
28 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8. 
29 See Chi, supra note 24, at 207-10; see also Amber Wang, Victory At Last for Taiwan’s Veteran Gay 
Rights Champion, FRANCE 24, May 25, 2017, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20170525-victory-last-taiwans-veteran-gay-rights-champion.  
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the police harassing practice against gays and lesbians.30 During this period, Mr. Chi 
managed to keep the flame of the fight for same-sex marriage, although his activist comrades 
were generally lukewarm about this issue. In 1994 when Taiwan’s democratic transition was 
at its full speed, Mr. Chi also relaunched his campaign for same-sex marriage. He shifted 
focus to the executive branch this time. Mr. Chi paid a visit to a career official with the 
Ministry of the Interior with the submission that same-sex marriage could be recognized 
under the existing Civil Code. This time he received a more civilized response from the 
government official, who considered his submission interesting and agreed to refer it to the 
Ministry of Justice for further studies. Despite that polite encounter, the Ministry of Justice 
shortly concluded that the Civil Code essentially defined marriage as a gender-differentiated 
union between a man and a woman.31 
Entering the late 1990s, the gay rights movement had already made substantial progress 
in fighting against discrimination while Taiwan was at the height of its constitutional 
moment. The wide coverage of the public celebration of the wedding between the renowned 
writer Mr. Yu-Shen Shu with his male partner in the media in late 1996 cast light on the 
public consciousness of gay rights issues.32 In addition, the National Administration began 
to commission academic research projects in relation to the future antidiscrimination 
legislation in this period.  Though the antidiscrimination legislation did not come into effect 
until after 2004,33 the legislative policy recommended by those academic research projects 
                                                
30 See Tsu-chieh Chien, From “Same Sex Marriage” to “Pluralistic Family Arrangements”: The Legislatvie 
Movement for Democratic Intimate Relationship, 1 TAIWAN HUM. RTS. J. 187, 189 (2012) (article in Chinese 
with English title). 
31 Notably, the Ministry of Justice’s conclusion, which was issued as an interpretive circular, became the 
origin of the official position on the definition of marriage under the Civil Code. See Interpretation No. 748, 
supra note 2, ¶ 8.  
32 See Henry Chu, In Taiwan, Gay Life Has Zest, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2000, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/10/news/mn-28479.  
33 Antidiscrimination legislation on education, which was passed in 2004, is the first antidiscrimination 
legislation that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Hwei-Syin Chen (陳惠馨), Xing Bie 
Ping Deng Jiao Yu Fa: Taiwan Xing Bie Jiao Yu Zhi Ji Wang Yu Kai Lai (性別平等教育法--台灣性別教育之
繼往與開來) [Gender Equality Education Act: The Past, Present and Future of the Gender Education in 
Taiwan], 30 Xing Bie Ping Deng Jiao Yu Qi Kan (性別平等教育期刊) [GENDER EQUALITY EDUC. Q.] 115, 
118 (2005).  
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indicated the currency that the gay rights movement had gained in the late 1990s.34  
In the meantime, Mr. Chi did not abandon his fight for same-sex marriage and 
challenged the definition of marriage head-on by applying for the first officiation of 
same-sex marriage in 1998 in Taiwan history. 35  To no one’s surprise, his try was 
unsuccessful again. Yet Mr. Chi changed his strategy once more.  Instead of petitioning the 
Parliament or seeking audience with the National Administration, Mr. Chi turned to the court 
this time. He took his case all the way to the TCC in September, 2000, presenting it with the 
opportunity to provide constitutional guidance on the equal citizenship of gays and lesbians. 
The TCC responded to that call with little interest and summarily dismissed Mr. Chi’s 
petition on grounds of admissibility in May, 200136 when the main opposition force the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had already won the Presidency and controlled the 
National Administration for almost one year. 
B. The Absent Constitutional Voice in Marriage Equality: 2001-2015  
When the TCC dismissed Mr. Chi’s constitutional petition, the gay rights movement 
had already gone a long way. President Shui-Bian Chen of the DPP pledged to build the new 
democracy of Taiwan on the principle of human rights after his unexpected and historic 
electoral victory in March, 2000. One of the fruits of the first DPP government’s human 
rights project was the draft Human Rights Bill of 2003 (the Bill).37 Answering the calls from 
gay rights activists, it provided that gays and lesbians could enter into a familial union with 
the legal right to adopt children.38 Though it was unclear whether the draft Bill allowed of 
same-sex marriage by the provision of familial union, it was regarded as the first intimation 
of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Nevertheless, when the draft Bill was 
                                                
34 For example, taking account of the strong public reaction to a deadly campus bullying of an effeminate 
pupil, Yung-Zhi Yeh, in 2000, the concluding report of the commissioned project on antidiscrimination 
legislation concerning education later suggested that the scope of the draft legislation be extended to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id. at 126-27.  
35 See Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8; Chi, supra note 24, at 214-16.  
36 See Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8; Chi, supra note 24, at 216-17.  
37 The Bill was drafted by the Ministry of Justice in 2001 and endorsed by the Presidential advisory 
committee of human rights in 2003. See Chien, supra note 30, at 189. 
38 Id.  
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published in 2003, it found difficulty winning a wide range of support within and without the 
DPP not only for its progressive stance on gay rights but also for other provisions. As the 
DPP government was already in the election mode with the 2004 presidential election in 
sight, the contested draft Bill was never approved by the council of ministers with the 
National Administration, not to mention introduced in the Parliament.39 
It is worth noting that despite the setback on the Bill of 2003, the gay rights movement 
continued to make progress under the DPP government. Answering the public calls for 
stopping the discrimination against students with different sexual orientation in the wake of 
an effeminate pupil Yung-Zhi Yeh’s tragic death in 2000, the Ministry of Education included 
the elimination of all types of campus discrimination in its mandate soon after the 
inauguration of the DPP government in 2000.40 Moreover, following the legislation banning 
campus discrimination in June 2004 after President Chen’s re-election, further amendments 
were made on employment laws to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation.41 In 
contrast, same-sex marriage was taken off the government agenda as the DPP government 
lost the appetite for another divisive battle when it was bogged down by the litigations aimed 
at annulling the 2004 presidential election result in the first sixteen months of President 
Chen’s second four-year term.42  
Though the DPP government was lukewarm about the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, the flame of same-sex marriage remained alight and was made even brighter 
unexpectedly. On March 5, 2006, the film Brokeback Mountain won the Taiwanese 
American Mr. Ang Lee the Best Director in the 78th Academy Awards. Mr. Lee’s 
achievement made headlines in Taiwan and the huge box-office success that Brokeback 
                                                
39 See Yan-Yu Chiou (邱彥瑜), Chong Ji Chuan Tong vs. Bo Duo Ren Quan: Tong Zhi Hun Yin Fa An Guo 
Bu Guo (衝擊傳統 vs. 剝奪人權: 同志婚姻法案過不過?) [Tradition vs. Human Rights: Will the Sam-Sex 
Marriage Bill be Passed?], PTS NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 22, 2014, http://pnn.pts.org.tw/main/2014/12/22/立院初
審：衝擊傳統-vs-剝奪人權-同志婚姻法案過/.  
40 See Herng-Dar Bih (畢恆達), Cong Liang Xing Ping Deng Dao Xing Bie Ping Deng: Ji Yung-Zhi Yeh (
從兩性平等到性別平等：記葉永鋕) [From Sex Equality to Gender Equality: Remembering Yung-Zhi Yeh], 
13 Liang Xing Ping Deng Jiao Yu Ji Kan (兩性平等教育季刊) [SEX EQUALITY EDUC. Q.] 125, 132 (2000).  
41 E.g., Hsiu-chuan Shih, Legislature Passes Anti-Discrimination Bill, TAIPEI TIMES, May 05, 2007, at 3; 
Flora Wang, Law Tackles Job Discrimination, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at 2. 
42 See Kuo, supra note 12, at 614-17. 
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Mountain made there was considered the mirror of the public consciousness of gay rights. 
Notably, Mr. Ying-Jeou Ma of the then opposition Nationalist Party (also known as 
Kuomintang, KMT), who had embraced the cause of gay rights during his eight-tear 
(1998-2006) mayoralty in Taipei City, the national capital, to win the support of the liberal 
forces for his conservative KMT, expressed his praise for the gay love story in Brokeback 
Mountain.43 Coincidently, Ms. Bi-Khim Hsiao, a DPP parliamentarian who was a vocal 
supporter of the gay rights cause, held the first parliamentary hearing on the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in Taiwan history on March 24, 2006 and formally introduced a private 
member bill of the legislation on same-sex marriage in October.44 That legislative bill was 
killed soon after it was introduced. 45  Yet its introduction, together with Mr. Ma’s 
endorsement of the gay rights movement, meant that the issue of same-sex marriage was 
brought closer to the frontline of the fight for the equal rights of gays and lesbians, 
transcending the DPP-KMT divide. 
The DPP government was deeply mired in corruption scandals in the last two years of 
its second term and had neither the political will nor the political capital to push for same-sex 
marriage. The executive branch’s disengagement from the legalization of same-sex marriage 
as well as gay rights issues in general did not change after the KMT took power in May, 
2008, although Mr. Ma held sway from the presidential office this time. Facing this new 
political landscape, a number of advocacy groups for gender equality and gay rights 
co-founded the Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights (TAPCPR), the first 
nongovernmental organization focused on the issue of marriage equality in Taiwan, in late 
2009.46  
The concrete result of the TAPCRP’s effort was the publication of the so-called “Three 
Bills for Diverse Families” in July, 2012.  Though they all were the amendment of the Civil 
                                                
43 Ling-Jia Fan (範凌嘉), Ying-Jeou Ma Hui Ang Lee Tan Duan Bei Shan: Jack Hui Mou Hen Mi Ren (馬
英九會李安談斷背山：Jack 回眸很迷人) [Ying-Jeou Ma Speaking with Ang Lee About Brokeback 
Mountain: Jack Has a Charming Smile], SINA, Mar. 20, 2006 
http://news.sina.com/udn/000-000-101-103/2006-03-20/2315742808.html.  
44 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 9. 
45 See id.; Chien, supra note 30, at 189. 
46 See Chien, supra note 30. 
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Code, the TAPCRP put forward three (instead of one) legislative proposals to accommodate 
the diverse positions on the question of same-sex marriage among LGBT groups, ranging 
from the legalization of same-sex marriage to the creation of homosexual and heterosexual 
partnerships to the legal recognition of multiple-person civil unions.47 Needless to say, the 
TAPCRP’s accommodating approach to legislation was avant-garde and way ahead of its 
time. Yet, soon after the TAPCRP published its proposals, Ms. Mei-Nu Yu, a DPP 
parliamentarian and long-time women’s rights advocate, introduced a private member bill to 
amend the Civil Code article 972 to provide for same-sex marriage in December, 2012.48 
Later in October, 2013 another DPP parliamentarian Ms. Li-Chun Cheng subscribed to the 
TAPCRP’s draft bill on the legalization of same-sex marriage among its three proposals and 
introduced it as a private member bill to revamp the entire opposite-sex marriage institution 
under the Civil Code.49 With both legislative bills proceeding to the committee stage and the 
momentum for the legalization of same-sex marriage continuing to grow, the Ministry of 
Justice openly opposed same-sex marriage.50 From then on, both legislative bills were 
stalled in the parliamentary procedures while the legalization of same-sex marriage not only 
became the focus of gay rights activists but was also brought to the fore in the public debate. 
Facing the blocked legislative channel for the legalization of same-sex marriage, the 
TAPCPR suggested that it would open another front before the TCC in August, 2014.51 
Both legislative bills eventually languished at the end of the Eighth Parliament in January, 
2016.52 
Notably, the TAPCPR’s suggestion that it would fight for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage before the TCC did not come out of the blue in August 2014. Nor was the 
                                                
47 See Victoria Hsiu-wen Hsu, Color of Rainbow, Shades of Family: The Road to Marriage Equality and 
Democratization of Intimacy in Taiwan, GEO. J. INT’L AFF., Summer/ Fall 2015, at 154.  
48 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 9. 
49 See id.; Hsu, supra note 47, at 159.  
50 See Lii Wen, Divisive Same-sex Marriage Bill Stalls in Legislative Yuan, TAIPEI TIMES, Dec. 23, 2014, at 
1.  
51 See Nick Duffy, Taiwan: Couples Protest Same-sex Marriage Ban by Attempting to Register 
Partnerships, PINK NEWS, Aug. 2, 2014, 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/08/02/taiwan-couples-protest-same-sex-marriage-ban-by-attempting-to-regist
er-partnerships/.  
52 See Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 9. 
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Parliament the only bully pulpit for the cause of same-sex marriage. To start with, when the 
Parliament was prodded into action in December 2012, a judicial battle for same-sex 
marriage had already been launched. Mr. Ching-Hsueh Chen and Mr. Chih-Wei Kao, who 
had publicly celebrated their wedding in 2006, applied for marriage registration in 2011 and 
soon took their case to the THAC after their application was rejected. Yet Mr. Chen and Mr. 
Kao withdrew their case in January, 2013 partly for fear that the THAC’s attempt to refer the 
case to the TCC would backfire, eventually resulting in the constitutional confirmation of the 
heterosexual-only marriage under the Civil Code.53 It was at this time that the champion of 
same-sex marriage, Mr. Chi, joined the latest round in the long legal battle for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. As noted in the procedural history of the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case, Mr. Chi applied for marriage registration with a man other than his partner 
in 2013.54 Obviously he made that application not to marry his partner but to test the TCC 
again when Mr. Chen and Mr. Kao made a calculating withdrawal. Mindful of Mr. Chi’s 
case working its way to the SAC, which later made its final judgement in September, 2014, 
the TAPCPR suggested that it would open another front before the TCC in August, 2014 to 
break the blockade of the legalization of same-sex marriage in the Parliament.55 
Yet, as noted above, Mr. Chi did not petition the TCC to intervene in his intended futile 
application for marriage registration until August, 2015.56 To understand the gap between 
the SAC judgment and his constitutional petition, we need to look at the political landscape 
outside the Parliament. In early 2014 when the legislative bills on the legalization of 
same-sex marriage were languishing in the Parliament, Taiwan was entering its election 
season with important local elections coming up in December, 2014. Among the hopefuls 
was the maverick Dr. Wen-Je Ko, who ran for the Taipei mayoralty as an independent. To 
                                                
53 See Amber Wang, Taiwan Gay Couple Drop Marriage Case, AFP NEWS, Jan. 23, 2013, 
https://sg.style.yahoo.com/news/taiwan-gay-couple-drop-marriage-case-045529837.html.  
54 Zi-Wei Liu (劉子維), Taiwan Tong Hun Tui Shou Chia-Wei Chi: Wo Bu Shi Zi Ji Yao Jie Hun (台灣同
婚推手祁家威：「我不是自己要結婚」) [Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Movement’s Mainstay, Chia-Wei Chi: 
“I Didn’t Fight Because I Intended to Enter into Marriage”], BBC 中文網 [BBC CHINESE], May 25, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-40048682.  
55 Notably, the legal counsel of Mr. Chi’s case before the SAC was Ms. Victoria Hsiu-wen Hsu, a veteran 
gay rights activist and lawyer with the TAPCPR. 
56 See Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 8. 
 17 
win the support of progressive forces, he made a campaign pledge on marriage equality. 
Other candidates also expressed their support for gay rights.57 As it turned out, Dr. Ko and 
other candidates who campaigned on policies friendly to gays and lesbians did not 
antagonize their constituents and all of them were elected. In other words, despite the 
stalemate in the Parliament, the wider political landscape had already changed in favor of the 
cause of gay rights. As we have mentioned above, Mayor Ko made good on his campaign 
promise in July, 2015 with the TMG’s constitutional petition.58 Correspondingly, Mr. Chi 
ended his long wait after the SAC judgment in September 2014 and took the case to the TCC 
again in August, 2015. Mr. Chi put his legal case on hold to wait for the arrival of his 
personal constitutional moment after the political landscape shifted. Yet the TCC remained 
silent when two constitutional petitions on same-sex marriage came before it in November, 
2015. It was unclear whether the TCC would dismiss the cases again after its first dismissal 
almost fourteen years ago. 
C. The Sought-After Constitutional Guidance in the Last Mile: 2016-- 
In the heat of the campaign season in 2015, the cause of gay rights and 
same-sex-marriage had already become the focal point of the political debate. More and 
more cities and counties provided for the annotation of “partnership” for same-sex couples in 
the locally administered household registration, although such annotation was symbolic 
without legal substance.59 Moreover, as the presidential and parliamentary elections were 
approaching in January, 2016, no candidate could dodge the question of marriage equality. 
Among the numerous hopefuls for the Presidency and the Parliament, the DPP presidential 
candidate Ing-wen Tsai pledged to support “marriage equality.”60 When she won the 
                                                
57 See Andrew Jacobs, For Asia’s Gays, Taiwan Stands Out as Beacon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014, at A6. 
58 See Christie Chen, Taipei City to Seek Constitutional Interpretation on Gay Marriage, FOCUS TAIWAN, 
July 23, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/search/201507230019.aspx?q=same%20sex%20marriage.  
59 In May, 2015, Kaohsiung became the first city in Taiwan to allow same-sex couples to register 
partnership. As of June, 2017, seventeen cities and counties have already followed suit. For further details, see 
More Cities and Counties in Taiwan Introduce Gay Partnership Registry, CHINA POST, June 7, 2017, 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2017/06/07/498425/more-cities.htm.  
60 On October 31, 2015, Tsai posted a video on her Facebook page on the day of the Taiwan Pride to show 
her support for marriage equality. See Saurav Jung Thapa, Pro-Equality Candidate Triumphs in Taiwanese 
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Presidency by a wide margin and her DPP also secured the majority of the seats in the 
Parliament, it seemed that the legalization of same-sex marriage would come to pass before 
long. 
Yet it turned out that the legalization of same-sex marriage was more of campaign 
fanfare than an immediate policy item to Tsai’s DPP government. It was simply not high on 
her agenda in terms of the lack of consensus both within and without her party.61  In 
parallel, parliamentarians were more and more vocal about their support for the same-sex 
marriage movement in the new Parliament. Against this backdrop President Tsai’s TCC 
Justice appointment in October, 2016 presented itself as the unexpected catalyst for breaking 
the stalemate on the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
President Tsai’s judicial appointments were expected as five Justices were scheduled to 
leave office on the completion of their eight-year term at the end of October. What was 
unexpected was that President Tsai eventually packed the fifteen-member TCC with seven 
new appointments and their dramatic role in setting the stage for the constitutional battle 
over same-sex marriage. Apart from the five Justices whose term was scheduled to end, the 
President and the Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, who also served as the Chief Justice 
and the Deputy Chief Justice of the TCC, respectively, decided to step down considering 
increasingly loud calls for their early resignation. As a result, President Tsai had the chance 
to reconfigure the TCC in an unexpected and substantial way.62 Considering the replacement 
of nearly half (seven out of fifteen) of the TCC Justices, it was not unreasonable to assume 
that the TCC would break its silence on the question of same-sex marriage. What defied 
reason was that the long-awaited change took place at an accelerated speed due to an Act of 
God.  
As the debate over the legalization of same-sex marriage was heating up, the seven 
                                                                                                                                                 
Presidential Elections, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Jan. 20, 2016, 
http://www.hrc.org/blog/pro-equality-candidate-triumphs-in-taiwanese-presidential-elections.  
61 See Brian Hioe, Efforts by Tsai Ing-wen to Wash Her Hands of the Issue of Gay Marriage?, NEW BLOOM, 
Mar. 2, 2017, https://newbloommag.net/2017/03/02/tsai-gay-marriage-abandon-issue/.  
62 See Jau-Yuan Hwang et al., The Clouds Are Gathering: Developments in Taiwanese Constitutional Law – 
The Year 2016 in Review, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. _ (2007 forthcoming).   
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judicial nominees were expected to face questions from parliamentarians as to marriage 
equality and other issues concerning the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in their 
upcoming confirmation hearing. It was also anticipated that they would dodge those 
questions by appealing to reasons of judicial impartiality.63 Yet that assumption had already 
been upended even before the confirmation hearing started on October 13, 2016. More than 
half of the judicial nominees had responded to the question of marriage equality with 
frankness in their written answers to the questionnaires from parliamentarians.64 Yet, when 
Professor Tzong-Li Hsu, a former TCC Justice, who was chosen to serve as the President of 
the Judicial Yuan and the Chief Justice of the TCC, appeared in the first hearing session on 
October 13, he was mostly interrogated for his position on the relationship between Taiwan 
and China.65 The question of same-sex marriage did not draw much attention. This remained 
so until the confirmation hearing proceeded halfway towards its scheduled conclusion on 
October 20.  
On October 16, Jacques Picoux, a French citizen and respected retired professor of 
National Taiwan University, committed suicide. When his death broke the news next day, it 
transpired that he had been in despair after being prevented from all the medical and other 
decisions about his over three-decade-long male partner at and after his partner’s last 
moment because of their legally unrecognized relationship. Professor Picoux’s tragedy 
galvanized great public sympathy.66 Parliamentarians and the TCC Justice nominees were 
no exception. When Ms. Bi-Khim Hsiao, the DPP parliamentarian who introduced the 
historic private member bill on the legalization of same-sex marriage in October 2006, told 
the story about Professor Picoux and raised the constitutional question of marriage equality 
with the nominee, Mr. Jui-Ming Huang, on October 19, the week-long confirmation hearing 
reached the climax. Professor Picoux’s tragedy seemingly moved everyone. Being told that 
                                                
63 Id. 
64 See Wei-han Chen, NPP Releases Results of Grand Justice Nominee Survey, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 17, 2016, 
at 3.  
65 See Hung-ta Cheng et al., Hsu Offers German Model for PRC Ties, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 14, 2016, at 1.  
66 See Nicola Smith, Professor’s Death Could See Taiwan Become First Asian Country to Allow Same-Sex 
Marriage, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2016, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/professors-death-could-see-taiwan-become-first-asian-country
-to-allow-same-sex-marriage.  
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moving story and interrogated for their constitutional judgement on marriage equality, 
judicial nominees were expected to respond to the constitutionality of the Civil Code with a 
clear answer that would eventually turn Professor Picoux’s tragic death into a meaningful 
sacrifice for a greater cause. For the rest of the confirmation hearing, Professor Picoux’s 
story was shared between the interrogating parliamentarians and the interrogated judicial 
nominees time and again. Eventually most of the seven nominees lent their support for 
marriage equality.67 The public endorsement from the would-be official interpreters of the 
constitution breathed new life into another drive for the legalization of same-sex marriage in 
the Parliament.68 
In the meantime, the upcoming annual LGBT Pride Parade (Parade) was expected to 
become a popular demonstration for the cause of same-sex marriage. 69 Against this 
backdrop President Tsai, who had not put gay rights issues on the top of her reform agenda 
since her inauguration on May 20, 2016, reaffirmed her commitment to marriage equality on 
October 29 when the Parade was underway.70 Yet President Tsai was not the only politician 
who reconsidered the position under public pressure. In light of the shift in public opinion, 
parliamentarians reacted with a number of new private member bills.71 Among them was the 
bill to amend the Civil Code article 972 and other provisions, which was introduced by the 
DPP veteran parliamentarian Ms. Mei-Nu Yu and was essentially a slightly revised version 
of the bill that she had introduced in the previous Parliament in 2012.72 Suddenly the 
same-sex marriage question topped the political agenda. Yet the National Administration 
remained quiet and unconventionally refused to introduce a government bill before the 
Parliament in correspondence. 
                                                
67 See Editorial, Death Renews Same-sex Marriage Calls, TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 20, 2016, at 8.  
68 See Hwang et al., supra note 62; Abraham Gerber, DPP and NPP Start Push for Same-Sex Marriages, 
TAIPEI TIMES, Oct. 25, 2016, at 3.  
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70 See id.  
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72 Notably, Justice Jui-Ming Huang, Ms. Yu’s husband, later recused himself from the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case because of his wife’s parliamentary role.  
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To this new political landscape opponents of same-sex marriage reacted with 
homophobic anger. A series of counter-demonstrations were held with hundreds of 
thousands of people taking to the streets in November and December.73 Social forces were 
also mobilized to rival the advocacy for same-sex marriage. As the private member bills 
were vetted in November, public parliamentary hearings turned into violent brawls.74 
Amidst the polemics about same-sex marriage, the seven newly appointed TCC Justices 
assumed office on November 1. Without further ado, the newly packed TCC resolved to take 
up the two constitutional petitions from the TMG and Mr. Chi in November and December, 
2016, respectively, without public announcement after they had languished in the TCC 
docket for a year.75 
Correspondingly, all the private member bills cleared the committee stage on December 
26, 2016.76 Then they were referred to all party caucuses for a one-month-long compulsory 
reconciliation before it could proceed to the next parliamentary stage. Notably, all important 
legislative issues would have to be resolved in the stage of second reading at the plenary 
session. Thus, it remained to be seen whether the private member bills to legalize same-sex 
marriage would receive the support of the majority of parliamentarians after they cleared the 
committee stage.  
The final twist in the winding (pre)history of the Same-Sex Marriage Case came a 
week before the Parliament returned to business after its winter recess on February 17, 2017. 
On February 10, the TCC announced its admission of the two constitutional petitions and the 
decision to hold a public oral hearing on March 24.77 What was significant about the TCC’s 
announcement on February 10 was that it meant that the TCC must make its judgement by 
May 24, two months after the public hearing being held, according to the Constitutional 
Litigation Procedure Act (CIPA) and the TCC’s bylaw on public hearings. In other words, 
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the day of constitutional reckoning was fixed for same-sex marriage.  
The TCC’s announcement was a godsend not only to the deadlocked Parliament but 
also to President Tsai’s oscillating government. Reflecting the conflicted state of public 
opinion on the legalization of same-sex marriage, parliamentarians were still divided on how 
to proceed with the private member bills. The compulsory reconciliation did not inch them 
forward. In the meantime, the National Administration and President Tsai continued to 
deflect public calls for a corresponding government bill on same-sex marriage in the place of 
the private member bills.78 Neither the DPP-controlled Parliament nor President Tsai’s 
government would take the lead in driving the legalization of same-sex marriage. Instead, 
they suspended all the legislative moves on that issue and simply passed the buck to the 
TCC,79 which had been absent from the debate about the constitutional rights of gays and 
lesbians for decades. As President Tsai’s government later was forced to reveal its hesitant 
position towards same-sex marriage by way of the Ministry of Justice’s as well as the 
Ministry of the Interior’s statements in response to the TCC’s request80 and the Parliament 
had no appetite for pushing that controversial issue, the TCC’s constitutional guidance 
appeared to be the last hope for Mr. Chi and other gay rights activists. 
To sum up, the (pre)history of the Same-Sex Marriage Case shows that same-sex 
marriage did not come into focus in the struggle for the rights of gay and lesbians out of the 
blue. Though it had already been on the antidiscrimination agenda at the outset, it became 
the rallying call for gay rights advocates as a result of the decades-long social movement. In 
contrast, the question of same-sex marriage was the first issue concerning gay rights that 
came before the TCC.81 This discrepancy preconditions the law and politics of the Same-Sex 
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Marriage Case. 
III. THE SHADOW OF (GREATER) OBERGEFELL 
Obergefell is great as it completes the journey towards constitutional recognition of full 
citizenship of gays and lesbians that was set out in Lawrence v. Texas.82 As part of the 
progressive constitutional redemption of American homophobia that manifested itself in the 
infamous Bowers v. Hardwick, 83  Greater Obergefell 84  comprises Obergefell proper, 
Lawrence, and United States v. Windsor.85 In this Part, we shall read the Taiwanese 
Same-Sex Marriage Case in light of Obergefell, showing that the shadow of Greater 
Obergefell pervades its core reasoning.86 Apart from the subject of same-sex marriage at 
issue, doctrine and principle guide our juxtaposition of the Same-Sex Marriage Case and 
Obergefell. Let us start with the doctrine. 
A. Doctrine 
Obergefell v. Hodges finds the legal definition of marriage as a union between a man 
and a woman in several states unconstitutional. In the SCOTUS’ view, the impugned legal 
provisions deprived same-sex couples of their fundamental freedom (liberty) to marry and 
right to equal protection by excluding them from the legal institution of marriage.87 In other 
words, when it comes to the question of same-sex marriage, two separate but related issues 
need to be addressed: the definition of the legal institution of marriage and same-sex 
                                                
82 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
83 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy traces the post-Bowers constitutional redemption 
back to Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 620 (1996)). Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
84 Professor Laurence Tribe refers to Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in these three cases as “the gay-rights 
triptych.” Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. 16, 22 (2015). 
85 570 U. S.__ (2013); 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
86 Specifically, apart from the one-paragraph holding, the judgment of the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
comprises nineteen paragraphs (ratio decidendi). Apart from the procedural history (¶¶ 1-6), the reason that the 
TCC resolved to hear the case (¶ ¶ 8-10), and the delimitation of the case law and statutory provisions 
concerned (¶¶ 11-12), the TCC set out the main argument in paragraphs 13-16. In the remainder, the TCC 
addressed the issues of remedies (¶ 17), the scope of its holding (¶ 18), and the inadmissibility of a secondary 
claim submitted by the TMG (¶ 19). Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2. 
87 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604. 
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couples’ right to marry.88 And that is exactly what lies at the core of Obergefell. For the 
present purposes, two features of Obergefell merit special mention in terms of doctrine. First, 
the SCOTUS reconstrues its own jurisprudence on the definition of marriage. 
Acknowledging the several dicta on marriage as a union of a man and a woman in its case 
law, the SCOTUS emphasizes that those dicta did not express its view on the legal definition 
of marriage.89 Instead, they were nothing more than “assumptions.”90 As far as doctrine is 
concerned, the question of whether marriage is a heterosexual-only legal union remains yet 
to be answered. Nevertheless, the SCOTUS leaves no stone unturned. By expressly 
overruling Baker v. Nelson, a one-line summary decision that dismissed an appeal from a 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision that denied same-sex couples the right to get married 
“for want of a substantial federal question,” 91  the SCOTUS clears all the possible 
precedential hurdles in its stride towards constitutional recognition of the fundamental right 
of same-sex couples to marry.92    
The second doctrinal feature of Obergefell concerns its attitude towards the relationship 
between the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. It is noticeable that the 
SCOTUS reaches its judgement on the unconstitutionality of the state laws providing for 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman on both constitutional grounds under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.93 As academic commentary has pointed out, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s Opinion of the Court in Obergefell continues his approach to the issues 
concerning the rights of gays and lesbians that began with his repudiation of Bowers v. 
Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas.94 Considered part of the new substantive due process 
                                                
88 This distinction is also recognized in the German jurisprudence and the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. See Anne Sanders, Marriage, Same-Sex Partnership, and the German Constitution, 13 GERMAN 
L.J. 911, 916-17 (2012) (discussing “the [individual] freedom to conclude marriage with the partner of one’s 
choice” and “the institution of marriage” in German constitutional law); PAUL JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHT 155-58 (2013) (discussing Schalk and Kopf v. Austria ([2010] ECHR 
1996, 30141/04), which distinguished between the right to marriage and marriage as an institution under article 
12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)). 
89 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
90 Id. 
91 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
92 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at. 2598. 
93 Id. at 2597-2604. 
94 See Tribe, supra note 84, at 22; Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom? Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 
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jurisprudence,95 this approach puts emphasis on the substance of rights as far as the 
discriminatory treatment or legal exclusion of gays and lesbians is concerned.96 As Justice 
Kennedy in his Opinion of the Court in Lawrence indicates, to address the material harm and 
stigmatizing effect imposed on gays and lesbians by the discriminatory legal provisions 
requires going beyond the discussion of equality. This does not mean that Justice Kennedy 
fails to take cognizance of equality concerns or delivers his opinion for the Lawrence Court 
purely based on the substantive right to liberty.97 Instead, he warily considers that without 
addressing the issue of substantive rights, the SCOTUS may end up in a Bowers-like 
situation again in which an apparently equal legal provision (providing for criminal 
punishment for sodomy regardless of whether the participants were homosexual or 
heterosexual) was upheld on the grounds of equal protection.98  
This substantive right-premised approach to tacking the legal discrimination of gays 
and lesbians becomes even clearer in Windsor of 2013. In that case, Justice Kennedy 
condemns the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) for its deprivation of the “equal 
liberty” of same-sex couples under the Fifth Amendment.99 Both the Due Process Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause are expressly invoked in Windsor. Speaking for the 
SCOTUS, however, Justice Kennedy suggests that the rights protected by those two separate 
constitutional provisions are interlocked and mutually enhanced as “[t]he liberty protected by 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against 
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”100 Notably, Justice Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
HARV. L. REV. 147, 169 (2015). 
95 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (including Planned Parenthood v. Casey (505 U.S. 
833 (1992)) in substantive due process cases). 
96 Yoshino, supra note 94, at 172-79.  
97 Though Lawrence is decided on the basis of the Due Process Clause, Justice Kennedy notes, “Equality of 
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of 
liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 575. 
98 See id. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence illuminates this point. Id. at 581-84 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
99 See Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability 
of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 17, 19 (2014) (characterizing Windsor as an 
“equal liberty” opinion); Helen J. Knowles, Taking Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided 
“quite apart from principles of federalism”, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 24, 25 (2015) (the same). 
100 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
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majority opinion glides from the discussion of substantive due process of liberty to that of 
equal protection. Though his reasoning is based on a two-pronged argument as to the issue of 
rights,101 it is hard to tell where he concludes the prong of liberty and proceeds to that of 
equality. Seen in this light, the protection of equal liberty emerges from out of the linkage of 
the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, indicating a “new equal 
protection.”102 
Adhering to this new approach to the legal discrimination of gays and lesbians, Justice 
Kennedy’s Opinion of the Court in Obergefell acknowledges the “interlocking nature” of the 
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.103 Liberty and equal protection are 
“instructive as to the meaning and reach of [each] other” when it comes to the question of 
same-sex marriage.104 It is worth noting that of the approximately nine pages in his opinion 
for the SCOTUS concerning substantive due process and equal protection, 105  Justice 
Kennedy devotes the first six pages to the fundamental freedom (liberty) of gay couples to 
marry.106 More important, what follows his discussion of substantive due process is not a 
separate argument as to how the constitutional doctrine about the equal protection of law 
would apply to this case. Instead, it elaborates on the linkage of liberty and equality 
claims.107 Taken together, under this synthesized approach, equal protection is virtually 
absorbed into liberty, serving as the qualifier of the potentially expansive substantive due 
process claim.108 Liberty takes precedence over equality in the question of same-sex 
marriage.109 Now let us shift attention to a different legal universe, the Taiwanese Same-Sex 
Marriage Case. 
                                                
101 Windsor also concerns issues about federalism. For an excellent discussion on the relationship between 
rights and federalism in that case, see Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of 
Rights and Structure, 95 B.U.L. REV. 587 (2015).  
102 Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011). 
103 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (citing Lawrence). 
104 Id. at 2603. 
105 Id. at 2597-2605. 
106 Id. at 2597-2602. 
107 Id. at 2603-05. 
108 See Yoshino, supra note 94, at 174; Yoshino, supra note 102, at 800-01. 
109 Cf. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
185-86 (2005) (noting that the Lawrence Court speaks the language of liberty rather than equality). 
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In the TCC’s reasoning on doctrine in the Same-Sex Marriage Case,110 one prior 
question looms large: Is there a constitutional issue at all?111 As noted in Part II, the 
Taiwanese Civil Code has long been understood as recognizing heterosexual marriage only, 
despite the absence of the explicit definition of marriage therein, since the Agreement to 
Marry Provision refers to “male and female” as far as the contracting parties to the required 
agreement to marry are concerned.112 Yet some activists and scholars have challenged the 
conventional wisdom. Reading the Agreement to Marry Provision in isolation instead of 
“intratextually” together with other provisions within the Civil Code,113 they contend that 
the contracting parties to an agreement to marry could be interpreted as including “male and 
male” and “female and female” alongside “male and female” parties. 114  With this 
“ingenious” exercise of statutory interpretation,115 the difficult issue of the constitutionality 
of the Agreement to Marry Provision would have been avoided and same-sex couples would 
have been allowed to marry with the Civil Code left untouched. Instead of jumping at that 
invitation for “classical constitutional avoidance,” 116  the TCC “constitutionalizes” the 
                                                
110 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶¶ 11-16. 
111 Id. ¶ 12. 
112 See supra note 20. 
113 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788 (1999) (“[in contrast to 
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rendering of the Civil Coder article 972 at the Ministry of Justice website 
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by the male and the female parties in their own [con]cord” may contribute to that alternative reading.   
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Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. 331 (2015) 
(suggesting that constitutional avoidance is restricted to the avoidance of constitutional questions excluding 
unconstitutionality). In what Professor Adrian Vermeule calls “classical avoidance,” courts should not lightly 
interpret a statute in a way that makes it unconstitutional as far as some other interpretation is available. Adrian 
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). In contrast, in its “modern” variety, 
constitutional avoidance means that courts should try to interpret statutes so as to avoid questions of 
constitutional law. For the Taiwanese equivalent to the canon of constitutional avoidance, the principle of 
“constitution-conformant interpretation”, which was transplanted from German jurisprudence, see Tzong-Li 
Hsu (許宗力), Fa Yu Guo Jia Quan Li (2) (法與國家權力（二）) [LAW AND STATE POWER, VOL. II] 183 (2007). 
For a discussion of “constitution-conformant interpretation” in other countries, Renata Uitz, Constitutional 
Courts in Central and Eastern Europe: What Makes a Question Too Political?, [2007] (2) JURIDICA 47, 
https://www.juridica.ee/juridica_en.php?document=en/international/2007/2/132526.PRN.pub.php.  
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question of same-sex marriage. Adhering to the orthodox interpretation of the Agreement to 
Marry Provision, the TCC paves the way for constitutional intervention where it further 
extrapolates the definition of marriage as a legal union of a man and a woman from other 
provisions of the Civil Code.117 On this view, the entire institution of marriage as provided 
for in the Civil Code is designed on the assumption of a gender-differentiated union of a man 
and a woman.118  
 Acting on its constitutional responsibility to protect (R2P), if you will, the TCC strikes 
down the legal institution of heterosexual-only marriage on the grounds of the equal freedom 
to marry.119 It is not difficult to guess that the Same-Sex Marriage Case is not the first time 
when the TCC has been asked to intervene in issues concerning marriage and family. It 
should also come as no surprise that the TCC has referred to the institution of marriage as 
existing between a man and a woman several times in its case law.120 Mirroring its US 
counterpart in Obergefell, the TCC situates its previous cases in contexts outside the debate 
as to whether marriage is restricted to a union of a man and a woman and emphatically 
declares, “The TCC has not made any Interpretation on the issue of whether two persons of 
the same sex are allowed to marry each other.”121 In this way, the TCC frees itself of its own 
past and allows itself to tackle the legal definition of marriage in the Civil Code and its 
constitutionality on a clean slate.122 
After distinguishing the immediate petitions before it from its case law on marriage, the 
TCC takes up the core doctrinal issue concerning same-sex couples’ right to marry. Just like 
the US Constitution, the constitutional document governing Taiwan does not enumerate the 
right to marry in its bill of rights.123 Even so, along with other unenumerated rights, the TCC 
                                                
117 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 12. 
118 Kuo & Chen, supra note 4. 
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decision. Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 17.  
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Constitution is entitled “Rights and Duties of the People.” For the purpose of communication, we substitute the 
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has already recognized the freedom to marry under the General Freedom of Action Provision 
(article 22), which is the functional equivalent of the substantive due process doctrine in the 
United States.124 Thus, echoing Obergefell, the Same-Sex Marriage Case is directed towards 
answering the question of whether the heterosexual-only marriage as provided for under the 
Taiwanese Civil Code has deprived same-sex couples’ equal freedom to marry as protected 
by the General Freedom of Action Provision and the Legal Equality Provision (article 7).  
The TCC answers that complex constitutional question affirmatively but tersely. The 
equal freedom to marry is conferred on same-sex couples within four paragraphs in the 
nineteen-paragraph reasoning (ratio decidendi) of the Same-Sex Marriage Case.125 The TCC 
starts with interpreting the freedom to marry as including the freedom as to whether to marry 
and as to whom to marry and reaffirms its constitutional basis under the General Freedom of 
Action Provision.126 Continuing to note the significance of the legal recognition of the 
exclusive and committed union into which a couple decide to enter, the TCC thus concludes 
that the General Freedom of Action Provision protects the freedom to marry a partner of the 
same-sex.127 
This justification merits close attention in light of the TCC jurisprudence on 
fundamental rights. Notably, as one of the eager embracers of the German-made principle of 
proportionality,128 the TCC has effectively approached the issues concerning constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
Constitution and the so-called Additional Articles, namely, Amendments), see Hwang et al., supra note 62; 
JIUNN-RONG YEH, THE CONSTITUTION OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 28-32, 38-48 (2016).  
124 In terms of text, the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is closer to the General Freedom of 
Action Provision in Taiwan. Yet, functionally speaking, the substantive due process doctrine fares better as the 
analogy. See Yoshino, supra note 94, at 148-49 (noting the protection of unenumerated rights and its 
relationship between the Ninth Amendment and the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments).  
125 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 13-16. 
126 Id. ¶ 13 (citing Interpretation No. 362). 
127 Id. 
128 See also Wen-Chen Chang, The Constitutional Court of Taiwan, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REASONING 641, 660-62 (András Jakab et al. eds., 2017) (discussing the TCC’s application of the principle of 
proportionality); cf. Cheng-Yi Huang & David S. Law, Proportionality Review of Administrative Action in 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION 305 
(Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016) (mentioning the adoption of German principle of 
proportionality in administrative law review in Taiwan).  
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rights in two stages in its jurisprudence.129 In the first stage of a rights case, the TCC defines 
the reach of the enumerated right or freedom at issue and it has made no exception to the 
cases concerning the General Freedom of Action Provision.130 As a result of its liberal 
interpretation, the constitutional bill of rights has been read in a libertarian spirit so as to 
accommodate virtually all imaginable claims.131 We hasten to add that this does not suggest 
that the TCC has produced a libertarian rights jurisprudence. Rather, following the first 
stage, the TCC situates the fundamental right or freedom concerned in context and decides 
whether the specific claim prevails in the immediate case before it according to the principle 
of proportionality.132 Proportionality works as the doctrinal tool to demarcate the scope of 
liberally defined constitutional rights or freedoms.133 In this light, the TCC in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case deviates from its rights jurisprudence as it waives the second stage after 
inferring same-sex couples’ right to freedom of marriage from the General Freedom of 
Action Provision.134 Instead of entering into the proportionality-framed analysis, the TCC 
proceeds to the issues concerning the Legal Equality Provision.135     
On that score, the TCC clarifies the “suspect classifications” in the Legal Equality 
Provision as non-exhaustive in the first place.136 Yet, in a surprising twist, what ensues turns 
out to be a refracted image of Obergefell. Specifically, the TCC posits that the 
                                                
129 For the two-stage structure of prima facie rights and proportionality, see KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL 
MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 4-5, 178-81 (2012). 
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132 See the cases cited in supra note 130.  
133 See MÖLLER, supra note 129, at 180. 
134 Kuo & Chen, supra note 4. 
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136 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 14. 
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heterosexual-only marriage under the current Civil Code amounts to a discriminatory 
treatment of same-sex couples’ freedom to marry.137 Up to this point, freedom to marry, as 
opposed to equality, remains at the center of the doctrinal argument in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case. Yet that is where freedom talk stops. Instead, the TCC then organizes its 
equality-based argument around the discriminatory harm that gays and lesbians have 
suffered under the current institution of heterosexual-only marriage.138 While the reasoning 
about freedom to marry centers on the subjects of marriage, equality-based argument is 
directed at the institution of marriage. In the former, the tone of the TCC is affirmative as it 
speaks to the right to freedom to marry; in the latter, it sounds negative insofar as the TCC 
emphatically condemns the discriminatory effect of the current marriage institution on gays 
and lesbians by appealing to the Legal Equality Provision. 139  Despite the seeming 
separation, these two parts of the TCC reasoning—freedom and equality—are effectively 
interlocked, suggesting a new approach to the legal treatment of gays and lesbians in the 
TCC jurisprudence.  
In light of Obergefell, freedom and equality can be seen as complementing each other 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. On this view, the equality argument in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case is not so much a separate doctrinal analysis of the Legal Equality Provision 
as the evaluative yardstick for the delimitation of the freedom to marry,140 serving as the 
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functional equivalent of the missing proportionality analysis in the TCC reasoning. The 
conspicuous absence of its case law on the Legal Equality Principle casts further light on the 
distinctiveness of the TCC’s consideration of equality in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. It 
turns out that unlike the TCC’s conventional doctrine on equal protection cases, the 
equality-based argument is meant to be instructive as to the concrete meaning and reach of 
the freedom to marry in the Same-Sex Marriage Case.141 Moreover, as the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case is the first case about the rights of gays and lesbians reaching the TCC, it 
cannot afford to disconnect the equality-based claim from that tied to (substantive) freedom. 
Otherwise, the TCC may end up in the embarrassing situation in future cases as Justice 
Kennedy has warily entertained in Lawrence: the equality-based claim may prevail in the 
fashion of levelling down the general protection of law instead of levelling up the legal 
treatment of gays and lesbians.142 Taken together, the Same-Sex Marriage Case reflects 
(Greater) Obergefell to the extent that freedom precedes equality while both are evolving 
into an interlocking constitutional doctrine in the scrutiny of the legal treatment of gays and 
lesbians. 
To sum up, in terms of doctrine, both (Greater) Obergefell and the Same-Sex Marriage 
Cases enter into dialogue with its own precedential forebears and end up distinguishing 
themselves from the case law on the gender-differentiated definition of marriage. Also the 
doctrinal implications of both lines of cases are more than the legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage. When it comes to the legal treatment of gays and lesbians in general, both suggest 
an interlocking approach to the claims concerning freedom/ liberty and equality. Instead of 
sorting the claims into the corresponding doctrinal headings and treating them accordingly, 
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(Greater) Obergefell and the Same-Sex Marriage Case converge on the precedence of 
(substantive) freedom/ liberty over (formal) equality and their interlocking structure.143 Thus 
emerges the constitutional right to equal liberty.    
B. Principle 
As shown above, a doctrinal parallel can be observed between Obergefell and the 
Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case, indicating a new and synthesized approach to the dual 
claims of freedom/ liberty and equality. It seems to be a logical move to assume that the 
principle underpinning the architecture of the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence also bears out 
the TCC’s doctrinal approach in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Whether this is true or not 
requires a closer look at both lines of cases instead of a guessing game about what lies 
underneath their shared doctrinal stand.  
In the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence, there are two underlying components of its 
doctrinal synthesis of substantive due process of liberty and equal protection: the concept of 
dignity and the harm principle. Justice Kennedy first put forth the concept of dignity in his 
majority opinion in Lawrence. In repudiating the Bowers Court’s characterization of the 
Georgian statute criminalizing sodomy as merely an instance of government regulation of 
sexual conduct, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the type of sexuality that Georgia intended 
to regulate by criminal punishment was part of two people’s choice to establish a special 
personal relationship between them.144 That relationship could involve intimate conduct but 
did not stop at that. To regulate an intimate conduct involving sexuality that took place in the 
private space, the Georgian law amounted to intruding into that special personal relationship 
between two people.145 More important, no matter what type of sexuality such relationship 
might involve, the individuals who entered upon that relationship “retain[ed] their dignity as 
free persons.”146 That is why “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
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correct today” in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence.147 
That indictment of the Bowers Court speaks to the foundation of the Greater Obergefell 
jurisprudence. It lays down the principle that the respect for dignity enjoins the government 
from interfering in personal relationship in the private space, which is the reserved realm for 
personal choices. 148  Dignity and autonomy move in tandem: dignity is an innate 
characteristic of human beings as free agents while autonomy gives expression to dignity in 
the free exercise of personal choices.149 Both dignity and autonomy continue to guide the 
Windsor Court’s synthesized approach to the claims of liberty and equal protection when it 
assails DOMA for its “interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” conferred 
by some states.150 The principle of dignity as autonomy culminates in Obergefell where 
Justice Kennedy identifies the liberty to marry as one of those “personal choices central to 
individual dignity and autonomy.”151 
As discussed above, the principle of dignity as autonomy underlies Justice Kennedy’s 
liberty-based approach to the doctrinal synthesis of the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause. Alongside the concept of dignity is the second component of the 
liberty-equality “double helix” in the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence: 152  the harm 
principle, which draws the line at government interference with liberty. Recognized as the 
foundations of liberal theories of criminal punishment, the harm principle has been attributed 
to moral and political philosopher John Stuart Mill. 153  According to Mill’s liberal 
philosophy, the government and other societal authorities pose threat to individual 
independence and the idea of liberty is aimed at the delimitation of “the power which can be 
                                                
147 Id. at 578. 
148 Id. at 567; see also Tribe, supra note 84, at 22; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity 
in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355, 374 (2012). 
149 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 574; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2603; see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2694 (“moral and sexual choices” (citing Lawrence)). 
150 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (emphasis added). Notably, Professor Bruce Ackerman calls this line of 
argument the dignity-based anti-humiliation principle and traces it back to Brown. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 137-40, 307-09 (2014).  
151 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597 (emphasis added); but cf. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (regarding 
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152 Tribe, supra note 84, at 20. 
153 David A.J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon to a Theory of 
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, LAW & CONTEMP. POBS., Winter 1988, at 123, 123-24. 
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legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”154 Building on this foundational 
principle, Mill set out his famous harm principle: 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others … The 
only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that 
which concerns others. In the part that merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign.155 
In other words, the government has no justification whatsoever to interfere in individual 
activities or interpersonal relations unless it acts to prevent harm or other forms of adverse 
effect that may result from individual activities or interpersonal relations from being inflicted 
on other members of the society.156  
Though Justice Kennedy makes no mention of Mill or his moral philosophy in his 
Greater Obergefell jurisprudence, his approach to the substantive due process of liberty has 
been viewed as deriving from the harm principle.157 To address the historical wrong done by 
Bowers, Justice Kennedy in Lawrence approvingly invoked the American Law Institute’s 
(ALI) justification for not recommending criminal punishment for any consensual sexual 
relations conducted in the private space in its Model Penal Code of 1955.158 One of the 
reasons in ALI’s justification that Justice Kennedy cited to is that such a private conduct is 
“not harmful to others.”159 In other words, the government has no business interfering in 
interpersonal relations in private through sodomy law because such relations causes no harm. 
                                                
154 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 59 (Penguin Books 1974) (1895). 
155 Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added). 
156 See Richards, supra note 153, at 137-41 (discussing the harm principle in Kantian terms and its relevance 
to the right to privacy in American constitutionalism). 
157 RUBENFELD, supra note 109, at 186, 189-90 (critically discussing Lawrence’s constitutionalization of 
Mill’s harm principle). 
158 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
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While Windsor focuses on the harm or other adverse effects that DOMA inflicted on the 
same-sex couples who were legally married in some states,160 the influence of the harm 
principle is hard to miss in Obergefell. In response to those who contended that same-sex 
couples be excluded from the right to marry for the alleged adverse effects on marriage from 
allowing same-sex couples to marry,161 Justice Kennedy simply observes, “[those] cases 
involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm 
to themselves or third parties.”162 The harm principle lays the philosophical foundations for 
the “new birth of freedom.”163  
Our discussion so far has shown that the concept of dignity and the harm principle lie 
underneath the doctrinal architecture of the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence. Now we turn 
focus to the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case. In line with its Civil Law style of judicial 
syllogism, 164  the TCC approaches the meaning of fundamental rights deductively. 165 
Despite invoking no precedential authority, the TCC attaches freedom to marry to the 
concept of decisional autonomy.166 Moreover, human dignity and the development of 
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161 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606-07. 
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argumentation, see Chang, supra note 128. 
166 Though the TCC cites Interpretation No. 362 to the effect that freedom to marry comprises the freedom 
as to whether to marry and as to whom to marry, it stops short of referring to its case law when it proceeds to 
the doctrinal discussion of the General Freedom of Action Provision and the Legal Equality Provision. 
Interpretation No. 362 (1994), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=362 
(English translation). Notably, the TCC has adopted the concepts of decisional autonomy and human dignity as 
early as 1999 when it issued Interpretation No. 479 and Interpretation No. 485, respectively. See Interpretation 
No. 479 (1999), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=479; Interpretation No. 
485, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=485 (both in English). It was not 
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personality pivots on decisional autonomy.167 In other words, human dignity lies at the heart 
of the protection of constitutional rights, underlying the interpretation of the constitutional 
bill of rights (including the General Freedom of Action Provision from which freedom to 
marry derives). Thus, for the same consideration of human dignity and as a corollary of the 
decisional autonomy underpinning opposite-sex couples’ freedom to marry, the TCC confers 
the same freedom to marry on same-sex couples.168 Q.E.D. Taken together, the principle of 
dignity as autonomy lies at the core of the TCC’s freedom-based approach to same-sex 
couples’ right to marry in the Same Sex Marriage Case.  
As noted above, the harm principle sets the operational limit to government interference 
with personal freedom. Like its US counterpart in (Greater) Obergefell, the TCC does not 
mention the harm principle by name or refer to its theoretical founder. Yet this does not 
mean that Millian liberal philosophy plays no role in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. As we 
have argued in Part III.A., the TCC’s equality argument in the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
amounts to the doctrinal substitute for the missing principle of proportionality as the 
evaluative yardstick of the limits of government encroachment on same-sex couples’ 
freedom to marry. On this part, the TCC’s implicit adoption of the harm principle is 
discernible. Confronting the concerns raised over the indiscriminating extension of the right 
to marry to same-sex couples, the TCC categorically responds that the opposite-sex 
marriage-centered conventional morality would not be adversely affected as a result.169 
Moreover, the General Freedom of Action Provision recognizes unenumerated rights 
provided that they do not prejudice social order or public interest.170 Addressing that 
constitutional proviso, the TCC also contemplates possible harms as a consequence of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
until Interpretation No. 603 that the TCC was explicit about the importance of human dignity and decisional 
autonomy in the interpretation of constitutional rights. Interpretation No. 603, supra note 130. Following 
Interpretation No. 603, the TCC has invoked the guiding concept of decisional autonomy or human dignity in 
its jurisprudence concerning fundamental freedoms and rights in a number of Interpretations. For example, the 
TCC cites Interpretation No. 603 in Interpretation No. 689. Interpretation No. 689 (2011), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=689 (English translation). In contrast, 
the TCC conspicuously leaves this long line of precedents out in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Interpretation 
No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 13. We shall come back to this point infra Part IV.A.3.  
167 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶ 13. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. ¶ 16. 
170 See THE ROC (TAIWAN) CONSTITUTION, supra note 22. 
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recognition of same-sex couples’ freedom to marry before coming to conclusion. In the eyes 
of the TCC, no harm would result from the recognition of same-sex couples’ freedom to 
marry as it would not adversely affect the current Civil Code provisions for marriage or alter 
the social order that has been organized around opposite-sex marriage.171 Taken together, 
“adverse effect,” “prejudice,” and other forms of harm lie at the heart of the TCC when it 
gives constitutional sanction to same-sex marriage.172 The harm principle underlies the 
doctrinal analysis of same-sex-couples’ equal freedom to marry in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case. 
Reading the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence and the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage 
Case together, we have found a parallelism between both cases. On the one hand, they 
converge on the new synthesized approach to the dual claims of liberty/ freedom and 
equality when it comes to the legal treatment of gays and lesbians; on the other, they appeal 
to the concept of dignity and the harm principle in laying their common doctrinal approach 
to fundamental rights on a philosophical foundation. Though it is the TCC’s long established 
practice to make “blind” (or unattributed) reference to the doctrines or jurisprudence of 
foreign origin, it is not hard to see the jurisprudential trail of (Greater) Obergefell left in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case.  
Yet the sketch of the shadow of (Greater) Obergefell would not be complete without 
uncovering a puzzle buried in the jurisprudential juxtaposition of these two great cases. The 
puzzle is that the TCC does not completely leave Obergefell out but only cites it as a source 
of authority where it discusses the current opinion on the immutable nature of sexual 
orientation in medicine and psychology.173 In other words, the TCC refers to Obergefell as a 
psychiatric expert evidence instead of as a source of jurisprudential inspiration. This 
discrepancy in citation falls far short of concealing the influence of Obergefell on its doctrine 
and principle but only throws the shadowed image of (Greater) Obergefell into sharp relief 
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172 For the relationship between adverse effect and the harm principle, see Tatjana Hörnle, ‘Rights of 
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instead. What lies behind that citational aberration? After bringing the shadow of (Greater) 
Obergefell in the Same Sex-Marriage Case into the limelight, we move to solving that puzzle 
next. 
IV. IT’S BROWN, NOT OBERGEFELL   
One of the core issues facing every court is the question of sources of law because the 
legal authority that it appeals to reveals what court it is and how it persuades the parties 
before it and the public to accept what it rules.174 To the court, identity and legitimacy are at 
stake when it comes to the sources of law.175 That is why high courts in many jurisdictions 
are reluctant to cite foreign law in their formal judgements even though they are not 
necessarily skeptics about the benefits of foreign jurisprudence and comparative law.176 
Through this lens, the puzzle about the citational aberration in the Taiwanese Same-Sex 
Marriage Case can be better appreciated. The TCC deliberately left (Greater) Obergefell out 
on the part of its reasoning about doctrine and principle but invoked Obergefell proper where 
it went to unusual lengths to buttress its psychiatric opinion. To be slightly blunter, in the 
TCC’s calculation, Obergefell could not be mentioned where it deals with the question of 
law.177 When it comes to legal authority, whether it is binding or merely persuasive,178 the 
TCC is most concerned about the identity, or rather, “purity” of its sources of law so that the 
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judgement can be laid on a firm basis of legitimacy.179 
It is no exaggeration to say that same-sex marriage is a controversial and divisive issue 
everywhere in the world and even more so when it is decided by the court. On that score, the 
Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case is not distinct from Obergefell or Fourie for that 
matter.180 Yet, as our discussion of the (pre)history of the Same-Sex Marriage Case has 
shown, the TCC packed with its new members was plunged into the political vortex with no 
precedential building blocks affirming the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians on which 
it could rely when tackling the issue of same-sex marriage head-on.181 Without the support 
of precedential authority, the question of legitimacy facing the TCC became even more 
acute.182 That is what sets the Same-Sex Marriage Case apart from Obergefell. Because of 
the centrality of legitimacy to the Same-Sex Marriage Case, the TCC takes great pains to 
make a case for its decision to admit the constitutional petitions from the TMG and Mr. 
Chi.183 The two-year “remedial grace period”184 that the TCC willingly extends to the 
political branch also testifies to the TCC’s cognizance of the controversial nature of 
same-sex marriage and its concern about the judgment’s legitimacy in the public eye.185 As 
the question of legitimacy stands at the heart of the Taiwanese Same Sex Marriage Case, we 
need to look beyond the Greater Obergefell jurisprudence to make sense of its law and 
politics.  
In this Part, we move our focus from the issues surrounding doctrine and principle to 
how the TCC manages its own legitimacy through its style of judgment and embrace of 
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nonlegal authority in the Same-Sex Marriage Case.186 We first look at its style and then read 
it in light of the post-ruling politics. We conclude that Brown illuminates the law and politics 
of the Same-Sex Marriage Case better than Obergefell does as the TCC is bracing for a 
Brown moment in its history.  
A. Managing Legitimacy through Judicial Style 
As the style of judicial reasoning bears enormously on the legitimacy of the court and 
its judgment,187 we put the judicial style of the Same-Sex Marriage Case under the 
microscope. We identify and discuss three features—managed brevity, virtual unanimity, 
and scientific authority—in order.  
1. “We could all actually read it if we wanted to”188 
Professor Akhil Amar, a meticulous student of the U.S. Constitution and its life history, 
told of a story about the two “original” editions of the U.S. Constitution and its democratic 
accessibility at its bicentenary celebration.189 One was written in parchment with the 
signatures from the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention; the other was mass-printed at 
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quoting Akhil Amar).  
189 Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 281 (1987). 
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the American Founding and forgotten later with all its master copies lost today.190 He 
contended that the forgotten printed edition is greater than the parchment that has been 
memorably preserved in the National Archives because the constitutional text in the printed 
copies was the one to which the ratifying people had access whereas the signed parchment 
starting with the words “We the People” was not democratically accessible.191 Professor 
Amar’s story illustrates the relationship between mass printing and democratic accessibility. 
Thanks to its distinctive brevity in style, the fact that the U.S. Constitution can be printed as 
a pocket book rather than a multi-volume code collection further contributes to its 
“democratic accessibility” and “popular[ity]” so much so that it has been alluded to as what 
Thomas Paine called “the political bible of the state.”192 Moreover, the brevity of the U.S. 
Constitution in comparative perspective makes reading the constitution no longer a daunting 
business in the United States that only professionals would find of interest. Rather, the U.S. 
Constitution is brought closer to the people because of its brevity and accessibility.193 Thus, 
“[everybody] could actually read it if [she] wanted to.”194 
Looking from outside of the U.S. political psyche, people may suspect that the 
foregoing characterization of the U.S. Constitution as the citizen’s bible is a reflection of 
American civil religion,195 or worse, a symptom of “constitutional fetishism.”196 Yet the 
style of constitution-writing matters beyond the aesthetics of the US. Constitution indeed. To 
see this point clearly, it is worth recalling the now forgotten European Constitutional Treaty, 
also known as the EU Constitution.197 Before the electorates of France and the Netherlands 
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sounded the death knell for it in successive referenda in 2005, the style of the EU 
Constitution had raised eyebrows among some of its most intelligent students. Among the 
criticisms about its style was the unwieldy lengthiness of the treaty text.198 Professor Joseph 
Weiler once noted that the word count of the EU Constitution reaches as high as 66,497 in its 
English version excluding the 100,000-words’ worth of annexes and declarations attached to 
it, whereas the U.S. Constitution is only 4,600 words long.199 According to Weiler’s 
judgment, “[the EU Constitution] does not look like a constitution; [nor does] it…read like a 
constitution.”200 As it turned out, that personal judgment was more of sentencing than 
doomsaying.201 
The relationship between the brevity of a legal instrument and its democratic 
accessibility is not only of pertinence to a code or a statute but also applies to a judicial 
ruling. Apart from the settlement of individual disputes,202 judicial rulings function as an 
exercise of persuasion directed at the people so that they will come to terms with the 
meaning that the court gives to the law through its rulings.203 How to make a judicial ruling 
persuasive and on what criteria its persuasiveness is to be judged are too complex to be fully 
addressed here. Sources of legal authority, substance of reasoning, and of course, the 
outcome of the ruling, just to name three, all factor into its persuasiveness.204 Provided that 
we are speaking of the reasoning citizens who are open to persuasion based on the merits of 
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the judicial ruling, they are expected to read it before they make their own judgment as to its 
persuasiveness. To that extent, the accessibility of judicial rulings to citizens matters in the 
way that of statutes or legal codes does. For this reason, the growing length of the SCOTUS 
opinions in recent years has raised some issues.205 The longer the opinions become, the less 
likely the people are to read them through.206 As a result, the reasoning of the judicial 
rulings becomes more sophisticated in the eyes of legal professionals but less persuasive to 
ordinary citizens as the democratic accessibility of judicial rulings is lost in their erudition.207 
In this way, the traditional role of the SCOTUS Opinion in speaking the meaning of the 
Constitution to citizens is weakened,208 casting shadows over the legitimacy of judicial 
review itself.209 
Brown v. Board of Education is the paradigm case to illustrate the importance of the 
democratic accessibility of the judicial ruling to citizen readers in the preservation of judicial 
legitimacy in politically charged cases. There is no point of repeating the story about the 
contentious nature of school desegregation, the core issue in Brown, and the transformative 
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government officials to read and rely upon”); Daniel A. Farber, Missing The “Play of Intelligence”, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 147, 165 (1994) (noting that “judicial opinions are getting increasingly longer and more 
complex, yet seem to have less to say to much of their audiences”); see also Serota, supra note 187, at 657-61 
(suggesting that “long-windedness” as a contributing factor to the unintelligibility and the reduced democratic 
accessibility of the SCOTUS Opinions) 
207 See KAHN, supra note 174, at 96-104 (noting the weakness of erudite opinions when exposed to the 
“plain-text” argument); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1459-60 (1995) (noting 
the substantial increase in the length of judicial opinions and suggesting that judicial opinions have become out 
of the reach of nonspecialists). For the relationship between length and erudition, see Kenneth Lasson, 
Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 942 (1990). 
208 KAHN, supra note 174 , at 26; Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1431-32 (1995) (suggesting the importance of the court’s appealing to the lay audience 
through judicial style); but cf. Schauer, supra note 207, at 1463 (questioning if lay people are the targeted 
audience of judicial opinions at all). 
209 Nagel, supra note 186, at 161, 177; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 
263-94 (1991); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1524-26 (1988). 
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implications of that ruling to American society in this Article.210 Despite its epoch-making 
status, Brown has raised many issues about the role and legitimacy of judicial review in a 
constitutional democracy like the United States.211 Since its announcement in 1954, Brown 
has been critically acclaimed. In contrast to the result, the reasoning of the Brown Court has 
left much to be desired.212 For example, some commentators have indicated that Brown 
failed to point out the way forward in the face of the deep-rooted Jim Crow in American 
South;213 others have suggested that it fell short of addressing the issues surrounding equal 
citizenship in race.214 Yet Brown has been praised for its brevity in style.215 The brevity of 
Brown makes it more accessible to the print media,216 which was and remains to be a, if not 
the, dominant outlet of judicial decisions.217 Through the reporting of the full text of Brown 
                                                
210 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290-442 (2004) (contending that the contribution of Brown to the civil rights 
movement was indirect by intensifying the politics of dismantling Jim Crow). 
211 The classical examples include Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (criticizing Brown for falling short of the constitutional principle of neutrality); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
(1962) (putting forward the countermajoritarian theory of judicial review in view of Brown); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (providing a democratic justification of 
judicial review in the post-Brown debate); ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1995) 
(discussing how the court contributes to constitutional dialogue in a conflicted society).  
212 See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL 
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT 
BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID] (collecting scholarly critiques of Brown from different perspectives). 
213 See Jack Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 212, at 3, 6-8 (noting 
the de facto school segregation after Brown); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV., 379, 381-82 
(2011) (“[Brown] has required a Herculean effort — one well beyond the Court’s competence — to implement 
comprehensively”). 
214 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Concurring, in WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 212, at 100 
(rewriting Brown in terms of the constitutional history of national citizenship). 
215 See ACKERMAN, supra note 150, at 134 (praising Brown for its accessibility to the public and 
contribution to broader constitutional debate); LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., DO GREAT CASES MAKE BAD LAW? 
411 (2014); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 777 (2009); see 
also ROSALEE CLAWSON & ERIC WALTENBURG, LEGACY AND LEGITIMACY: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 2 (2008) (noting the feature of brevity of Brown and its greatness); cf. Liptak, Justices’ 
Opinions Grow in Size, supra note 205 (contrasting the brevity of Brown with The Great Gatsby-like, long 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (558 U.S. 310 (2010))); Liptak, Justices Long on Words, supra 
note 205 (contrasting the style of Brown with the lengthiness of Parents Involved v. Seattle (551 U.S. 701 
(2007))). 
216 For the relationship between the judicial opinion’s brevity and its communicability through the press 
coverage, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 181 
(1988).  
217 See JOE MATHEWSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS: THE INDISPENSABLE CONFLICT 349-50 
(2011) (noting that “newspapers did better than television when it came to reporting the legal basis for the 
SCOTUS rulings); see also MICHAEL ZILIS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY: DISSENTING OPINIONS, MEDIA 
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in national newspapers,218 citizens could read the decision themselves and make their own 
judgment on the Brown Court. Moreover, the feature of brevity in Brown has been applauded 
for its contribution to the SCOTUS’ coordination function as it sent a concise message to 
other institutional actors.219 Its brevity also made it easier for differing positions to come to 
terms with the result of educational desegregation without being disaffected by the otherwise 
complex reasoning and its implications.220 Taken as a whole, Brown’s brevity in style plays 
a crucial role in turning it into a constitutional icon in American constitutional imaginary 
apart from standing as a canon to constitutional specialists.221       
Seen in this light, the unusual brevity of the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case 
deserves a closer look, too. Before going to the judicial style of the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case, we need to make an aside about the style of the TCC case law in general, which 
provides the foil for the distinctiveness of the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Though the TCC 
has been considered a judicial body of specialized constitutional review rooted in the Civil 
Law tradition and has identified itself with the image of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (GFCC), 222  its official designation, the Council of Grand Justices, 223  suggests 
                                                                                                                                                 
COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 77-96 (2015) (suggesting the importance 
of the reporting of the SCOTUS Opinions in national newspapers).  
218 See, e.g., Text of Opinion on Schools in States, WASH. POST, May 18, 1954, at 4; Text of Supreme Court 
Decision Outlawing Negro Segregation in the Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, available at 
http://politics.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/littlerock/051854ds-text.html; Supreme Court's Decision 
in U.S. School Segregation Cases, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 18, 1954, Part 1 at 8, available at 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1954/05/18/page/8/article/supreme-courts-decision-in-u-s-school-segregatio
n-cases. 
219 See Law, supra note 215, at 777-78; cf. Chemerinski, supra note 187, at 1713 (“[the SCOTUS decisions] 
have become much too long and thus far more difficult for lower courts and government officials to read and 
rely upon”). 
220 See Cass R. Sunstein, Practical Reason and Incompletely Theorized Agreements, in REASONING 
PRACTICALLY 267, 293 (Edna Ullmann-Margalit ed., 1998) (noting Brown as a case decided on “incompletely 
theorized agreement,” which fell short of setting out principles or rules but stands as the analogy of further 
desegregation and other equal protection cases).  
221 Balkin, supra note 213, at 12; Greene, supra note 213, 381; see also Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The 
Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories about We the People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1069-70 & n. 107 (2012) 
(suggesting Brown and other civil rights cases as part of the reconstruction of “We the People” in American 
constitutional imaginary). 
222 See Yueh-Sheng Weng (翁岳生), Xian Fa Zhi Wei Hu Zhe: Xing Si Yu Qi Xu (憲法之維護者:省思與
期許) [Guardian of Constitution: Reflection and Expectation], in Xian Fa Jie Shi Zhi Li Lun Yu Shi Wu, Vol. 
VI (Part II) (憲法解釋之理論與實務 (第六輯) (上冊)) [CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, VOL. VI (Part I)] 1 ( Fort Fu-Te Liao (廖福特) ed., 2009) (suggesting the evolution of the TCC on 
 47 
something different.224 Apart from the formal designation, however, the TCC has stood in 
contrast to the GFCC, which has always worked like a court and spoken like a court since its 
creation in 1951.225 Rather, the TCC, which was inaugurated in 1948, has come closer to 
another variety of the Civil Law world, the Constitutional Council of the French Fifth 
Republic, when it comes to judicial decisionmaking. 226  Noticeably, conducting its 
proceedings in the ambience of an advisory privy council,227 the TCC was not obliged to 
hold any public oral hearings until 1993 when it was given the jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
the dissolution of anticonstitutional parties.228 More important, Interpretations have been 
rendered in a form resembling the abstract, concise, and formalistic rulings that have long 
been characteristic of the French style of judicial writing.229    
Yet the conferral of the jurisdiction on the TCC with respect to the dissolution of 
anticonstitutional parties in 1993 and the impeachment of the president or the vice president 
                                                                                                                                                 
the model of the GFCC as the guardian of the constitution); see also Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in 
East Asia: Understanding Variation, 3 J. COMP. L. 80, 84 (2008) (suggesting the continuing German influence 
on the development of the TCC). 
223 See supra note 1. 
224 See YEH, supra note 123, at 157. 
225 See JUSTIN COLLINGS, DEMOCRACY’S GUARDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1951-2001, at xxxv-xlii (2015). 
226 Chwen-Wen Chen, The Judicial Authority of Constitutional Courts: A Study Based on the Practices of 
Constitutional Judicial Review of R.O.C. and France, in CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, VOLUME VII at 379, 382-83 (Fort Fu-Te Liao ed., 2014) (article in Chinese with English title and 
abstract).  
227 Kuo & Chen, supra note 4. 
228 The constitutional amendment (Additional Article) of 1992 first provided for the TCC jurisdiction on the 
dissolution of anticonstitutional parties, namely, political parties that were judged to endanger the free and 
democratic constitutional order. That constitutional provision (currently Amendment V, section 4) was later 
implemented through the CIPA, which replaced its predecessor, the Council of Grand Justices Act of 1958, in 
1993. ROC (TAIWAN) ADDITIONAL ARTICLES, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000002. It is worth noting that the last 
constitutional amendment of 2005 further provides for the TCC jurisdiction on the trial of the president and the 
vice president with the judicialization of (vice) presidential impeachment process. Amendment I, section, 10. 
Id. The CIPA has not yet been changed accordingly to accommodate the impeachment trial procedures.  
229 See LASSER, supra note 164, at 245 (noting “the formalism of the official French judicial syllogism”). 
Legally speaking, the judicial style of the TCC Interpretations have changed several times. When the TCC was 
first created in 1948, its procedures were governed by its own bylaw. Its procedural self-governance lasted until 
the Council of Grand Justices Act was enacted in 1958. Pertaining to our present discussion, the 1958 
legislation changed the style of the Interpretation by splitting it into the holding and the ratio decidendi. 
Another change that the 1958 legislation brought about in judicial style was the publication of separate opinions 
(dissenting only). The CIPA of 1993 further brought in the publication of concurring opinions. See Chang, 
supra note 128, at 672; see also Hwang et al., supra note 62 (noting the inauguration of the TCC in Nanjing, 
China in 1948). 
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in 2005230 has changed the dynamic of the TCC decisionmaking process in a subtle way. 
Though the constitutional amendment only mandates the TCC to organize itself in the form 
of a constitutional tribunal and hold public oral hearings in cases concerning 
anticonstitutional parties or (vice) presidential impeachment, the CIPA, which governs the 
expanded TCC jurisdiction, also authorizes the TCC to apply the same special procedure to 
other cases.231 That paves the way for the TCC to turn itself from a judicial council into a 
constitutional court, at least in name.232 This institutional background holds the key to 
getting to the heart of the distinctiveness of the Same-Sex Marriage Case in judicial style.  
Since the granting of the new TCC jurisdiction and the introduction of the court-like, 
public oral hearings in 1993, no political party has ever been referred to the TCC for 
dissolution because of its anticonstitutional activities. Nor has the (vice) presidential 
impeachment process been opened before the TCC since 2005. Nevertheless, the TCC has 
invoked the post-1993 special procedure in other cases. As Table 1 suggests, out of the 440 
Interpretations rendered by the TCC in the period February 03, 1993—July 31, 2017,233 only 
ten were decided following public proceedings. The exceptional holding of public oral 
hearings in the TCC proceedings appears to suggest the extraordinary nature of these cases.  
Thus, it is the Big Ten that provides the reference point for the judicial style of the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case. 
 
 
 
                                                
230 For the details, see supra note 228. Both jurisdictions are currently provided for in Constitutional 
Amendments I, section 10 & V, section 4, respectively. 
231 CIPA article 13, http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030159.  
232 See YEH, supra note 123, at 159. 
233 The special procedure became legal when the CIPA came into effect on February 3, 1993. July 31, 2017 
was the date when the TCC went to recess. the Same Sex Marriage Case (Interpretation No. 748) was issued. 
Interpretation No. 313, which was announced on February 12, 1993, was the first Interpretation rendered post 
the adoption of the special procedure. 
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Table 1: Ten Judicial Yuan Interpretations holding public hearing(s)234  
Case 
No. 
Date of 
Ruling 
Date of 
Referral/
Petition 
Date of 
Hearing(s) 
Main Issue (s) Before the TCC Word Count 
of the 
Interpretation 
334 01/14/1
994 
01/21/ 
1993 
12/23/1993 What is the scope of “government 
bond” under the Government Bond 
Issuance Act? (statutory uniform 
interpretation) 
T: 1511 
H: 100 
R: 1411 
 
 
392 12/22/1
995 
10/16/ 
1989 
10/19/1995 
& 
11/02/1995 
Do public prosecutors have the 
power of pre-trial detention? 
T: 12106 
H: 967 
R: 11139 
419 12/31/1
996 
05/31/ 
1996 
10/16/1996 
& 
11/01/1996 
Is it constitutional for the President to 
appoint the Vice President as the 
Prime Minister? 
T: 14531  
H: 388 
R: 14143 
 
445 01/23/1
998 
06/27/1
995  
12/05/1997 Is the Assembly and Demonstration 
Regulation Act unconstitutional? 
T: 14085 
H: 1029 
R: 13056 
585 12/15/2
004 
09/15/  
2004 
10/14/2004 
& 
10/27/2004 
& 
10/29/2004 
Is the Extraordinary Parliamentary 
Investigative Committee (EPIC) Act, 
which provides the EPIC with broad 
prosecutorial powers among others, 
constitutional? 
T: 14928  
H: 3258 
R: 11670 
603 09/28/2
005 
06/06/ 
2005  
07/27/2005 
& 
07/28/2005 
Is the provision for the mandatory 
submission of fingerprints as a 
precondition for the replacement of 
national ID cards under the 
Household Act article 8 sections 2 
and 3 unconstitutional? 
T: 7805 
H: 893 
R: 6912 
689 07/29/2
011 
11/20/ 
2008 
06/16/2011 Is the provision of stalking as a 
misdemeanor under the Social Order 
Maintenance Act article 89 paragraph 
(2) overinclusive and 
unconstitutional with respect to acts 
of journalistic reporting and 
investigation?   
T: 5996 
H: 295 
R: 5701 
711 07/31/2
013 
11/08/ 
2011 
06/13/2013 Is the restriction of the pharmacist 
practicing in only one dispensary or 
apothecary under the Pharmacist Act 
article 11 unconstitutional? Is the 
administrative interpretation 
unconstitutional to include those who 
have both the pharmacist and nurse 
professional licenses in the foregoing 
provision? 
T: 5725 
H: 269 
R: 5456 
                                                
234 We compiled this information from the online official TCC case reports. 
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Case 
No. 
Date of 
Ruling 
Date of 
Referral/
Petition 
Date of 
Hearing(s) 
Main Issue (s) Before the TCC Word Count 
of the 
Interpretation 
737 04/29/2
016 
06/05/ 
2013 
03/03/2016 Is the restriction of the defendant's 
access to the evidence presented by 
the public prosecutor to the court for 
the writ of the pre-trial detention only 
to the supporting "fact" under the 
Criminal Procedure Act article 33 
section 1 and article 101 section 1 
unconstitutional?  
T: 4061  
H: 411 
R: 3650 
748 05/24/2
017 
08/20/ 
2015  
& 
11/04/ 
2015 
03/24/2017 Is the provision of heterosexual-only 
marriage under the Civil Code 
unconstitutional?  
T: 5664 
H: 227 
R: 5437 
Note: T: word count in total (the holding plus the ratio decidendi); H: word count of the holding 
only; and R: word count of the ratio decidendi only. 
 
 
 Overall, these cases result from the most important constitutional controversies of 
their time or concern crucial legal questions. Considering their implications to fundamental 
constitutional principles and contemporaneous politics, the TCC has held public oral 
hearings to engage the public in the legal and constitutional debate over these cases. The 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is no exception.235 Correspondingly, in most of these arresting 
cases, the TCC has deviated from its abstract, concise, and formalistic style. By issuing long, 
detailed holdings accompanied by legally binding rationes decidendi, the TCC intends to 
clarify the constitutional issues and settle the immediate legal dispute. Taken together, the 
TCC has preferred erudition to brevity in terms of judicial style when critical constitutional 
issues come before it. 
Yet the Same-Sex Marriage Case defies this generalization. Though the TCC held 
public oral hearings in view of the heated debate surrounding same-sex marriage, the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case stands apart from other cases in which public oral hearings have 
been held for its brevity. Apart from the first case decided according to the special 
                                                
235 See Hwang et al., supra note 62. 
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procedure, Interpretation No. 334, which concerns issues of statutory interpretation,236 the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is the Interpretation with the shortest holding among the nine 
constitutional cases, which weighs in at 227 words.237 To be clear, not only the holding itself 
but also the ratio decidendi of the Interpretation is legally binding and considered part of 
constitutional law in Taiwan.238 Thus, the terseness of the holding in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case falls short of telling the whole story about its distinctiveness in judicial style. Upon 
closer inspection, however, the holding of the Same-Sex Marriage Case appears to be 
indicative of its overall style.  
Specifically, in comparison to the length of the nine constitutional cases (with the 
holding and the ratio decidendi combined) that have been decided under the special 
procedure, the Same-Sex Marriage Case should be measured with the three endnotes in its 
ratio decidendi excluded. We exclude the over-900-word-long endnotes for two reasons. 
First, this is the only Interpretation accompanied by any endnote or footnote. Whether it sets 
out a new judicial style or a one-off deviation is too early to tell. Yet it is unprecedented for 
sure.239 The second reason is more important. As we shall further discuss later,240 all the 
three endnotes amount to listing the sources of nonlegal authority without contributing to the 
TCC’s legal reasoning. Thus, we take the exceptional endnotes out of the equation when we 
discuss the length of judicial reasoning in the Same-Sex Marriage Case.241   
Excluding the endnotes, the word count of the Same Sex Marriage Case in total is 
                                                
236 Interpretation No. 334 (1994), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=334 (English translation). The holding 
of Interpretation No. 334 is only 100 words long while its total word count (with the ratio decidendi included) 
is 1,511. Apart from the new jurisdictions provided for under Amendments I (section 10) & V (section 4), the 
TCC jurisdiction can be divided into constitutional and statutory (officially termed “uniform”) interpretation. 
See Hwang et al., supra note 62. 
237 We measure the length of Interpretations with the help of the Word Count tool provided by Microsoft 
Word. All the word counts indicated in this Article result from the foregoing tool after copying the TCC case 
report and pasting in Microsoft Word file. Notably, we did not exclude punctuation marks or distinguish 
Chinese characters from Arabic numerals.  
238 See supra note 229. 
239 We shall return to this point infra Part IV.A.3. 
240 See infra Part IV.A.3. 
241 It is worth noting that the three endnotes were not given paragraph numbers, suggesting that they stand 
outside the ratio decidendi.  
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5,664 whereas after rounding, the average of the nine constitutional cases (including the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case) is 9,433.242 While five of the nine constitutional cases are below 
the average length, only Interpretation No. 737,243 which weighs in at 4,016 words in its 
entirety, is even shorter than the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Nevertheless, a closer look at 
both cases will reveal that it is the Same-Sex Marriage Case, not Interpretation No. 737, that 
should be credited for its distinctive brevity. First, in terms of the substantive issue 
concerned, the former addresses a contentious and developing fundamental issue about the 
equal citizenship of gays and lesbians, while the latter concerns a technical issue in criminal 
due process.244 This may explain why the holding of Interpretation No. 737 is 80% longer 
than that of the Same-Sex Marriage Case whereas its ratio decidendi is almost 50% shorter 
than that of the latter:245 the technical issue in criminal due process demands feasible 
solutions and the correspondent arrangement needs to be sorted out at the same time, both of 
which need to be provided for in the holding, without much elaboration on fundamental 
constitutional principles. Moreover, unlike Interpretation No. 737, which originated in the 
constitutional petition filed by a criminal defendant,246 the Same-Sex Marriage Case is a 
consolidated case, which involves an individual constitutional petitioner and a statutory 
municipality.247 For this reason, six out of the nineteenth paragraphs of the ratio decidendi 
of the Same-Sex Marriage Case are directed at the procedural history.248 Noticeably, if we 
take the procedural history and other jurisdictional issues out of the equation and only take 
account of substantive reasoning in both cases, it turns out that the ratio decidendi of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is even shorter than that of Interpretation No. 737.249   
                                                
242 The average word count of all the ten cases that have been decided according to the special procedures is 
8,641 after rounding. Both figures are the rounding result based on the method of half round up with the 
endnotes of Interpretation No. 748 excluded. 
243 Interpretation No. 737 (2016), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=737 (English translation). 
244 See Hwang et al, supra note 62. 
245 The holding of Interpretation No. 737 is 411 words long whereas that of the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
totals 227 words. The former’s ratio decidendi weighs in at 3650 words, while the latter’s reaches 5,437 words.  
246 See Hwang et al, supra note 62.  
247 See supra text accompanying note 21-26. 
248 Interpretation No. 748, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1-6. 
249 The reasoning on substantive constitutional principles in the Same-Sex Marriage Case exists in 
paragraphs 13-16, the total of which weighs in at 1,395 words. In Interpretation No. 737, the TCC puts forward 
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As discussed above, the TCC’s choice of brevity over erudition in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case is uncharacteristic, especially in terms of the contentious nature of the issue 
before it. In light of quick responses from the National Administration and the public,250 the 
Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case appears to embody the virtues that have been attributed 
to the brevity of Brown. By answering a contentious issue with a concise constitutional 
judgment on which people holding different opinions on fundamental constitutional 
principles would converge, both the SCOTUS in Brown and the TCC in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case send a transformative message to the ongoing public debate—on 
desegregation in the former and on marriage equality in the latter—with an eye to keeping 
the public’s faith in their role in society.251 The legitimacy concern underlying the brevity of 
the Same-Sex Marriage Case will become clearer when we take the uncharacteristically few 
separate opinions accompanying it into account. 
2. “Having only two was unusual and awkward”252 
As the institution in charge of giving an authoritative interpretation of the law, the 
multimember court is expected to have a collective voice. Speaking in the name of the 
people,253 the institutional voice of the court gives its targeted audience, the citizenry and 
other branches of constitutional power as well as other institutional actors, a sense of 
certitude in the settlement of individual disputes.254 That the court should have a collective 
voice as an institution seems to have been taken for granted. Yet this has not always been the 
case in history. Following the practice of the English common law court judges, the Justices 
                                                                                                                                                 
its main argument in paragraphs 7-10 totaling 1,409 words.  
250 Wei-han Chen, Local Action on Household Papers Urged, TAIPEI TIMES, Jun 01, 2017, at 3 (reporting on 
the formation of an interministerial task force under the Executive Yuan in response to the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case). 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 77-82. 
252 Justice Samuel Alito was quoted as saying ‘[h]ave eight was unusual and awkward’ in a judicial 
conference in a report on the exceptional consensual SCOTUS in its 2016 term. Justice Alito’s quote referred to 
the composition of the SCOTUS following the death of Justice Anthony Scalia, which created the condition for 
the SCOTUS’ consensual 2016 term. Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for 
Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2017, at A16.  
253 KAHN, supra note 174, at 48-83.  
254 See MARY ARDEN, COMMON LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY: KEEPING PACE WITH CHANGE 251 (2015) 
(noting the requirement of certainty in judicial decisions); cf. KAHN, supra note 174, at 6 (suggesting that 
finality plays a less significant role in the SCOTUS).  
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of the SCOTUS issued their judgements seriatim in its preliminary stage.255 Each judge 
wrote his own opinion on the case, regardless of whether he agreed with the result or not. 
Even a single sentence from a Justice to the effect that he agreed to everything being said by 
his brethren on the bench would suffice.256 Under this common law practice, it would be 
ironic to speak of the opinion of the court. Only judges had opinions, although those 
opinions were given only because they were in robes.257  
As every student of constitutional law knows, Chief Justice John Marshall drove 
historic change on the SCOTUS in its early development. Note, we are not referring to the 
unprecedented Marbury v. Madison,258 which introduced modern judicial review to the 
world in 1803. What we have in mind is his introduction of the opinion of the court,259 
changing the judicial style and the SCOTUS as an institution forever. With the appointment 
of the lawyer-statesman John Marshall to the Chief Justiceship of the SCOTUS,260 the 
foregoing seriatim practice changed. Under his leadership, the SCOTUS moved away from 
the common law practice of seriatim judgments to what has been taken for granted ever 
since: the issuance of the opinion of the court authored by a single Justice accompanied by 
separate opinions.261 Speaking with a collective voice as an institution, the SCOTUS has 
since strengthened its image as the designated oracle of the US Constitution and thus 
constructed the imaginary connecting its interpretation of the Constitution to We the People 
                                                
255 KAHN, supra note 174, at 2; cf. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: 
INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 62-68 (2007) (discussing the inconsistent practice of the pre-Marshall 
SCOTUS in delivering opinions of the court). For a deep discussion of the issues concerning the early 
SCOTUS practice of issuing seriatim judgments and its connection to the English common law custom, see 
PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 109-14 
(2002). 
256 West v. Barnes (2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791)), the first decision made by the SCOTUS, is typical of the 
early practice of seriatim opinions with five opinions included. JAMES R. PERRY, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, VOLUME 6, at 3-27 (1985). For the practice of 
formal seriatim judgments in the British context, see POPKIN, supra note 255, at 31. 
257 See KAHN, supra note 174, at 2-3. 
258 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
259 ARDEN, supra note 254, at 251; KAHN, supra note 255, at 110; see also POPKIN, supra note 255, at 
62-68, 70-72 (discussing Chief Justice John Marshall’s establishment of the opinion of court in judicial style 
despite the nascent inconsistent practice in the pre-Marshall SCOTUS). 
260 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12 (1993) 
(including Chief Justice Marshall in the tradition of layer-statesmanship). 
261 POPKIN, supra note 255, at 70-72; KAHN, supra note 255, at 110; see also ARDEN, supra note 254, at 
250-51.  
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that fathered the Constitution.262 This is not only a change on judicial style but rather part of 
the constitution of the legitimacy of judicial review.263 Giving the opinion of the court in the 
place of the seriatim judgments, the SCOTUS has turned itself from a common law court 
into a constitutional power of modern judicial review.264 
The relationship between the collective voice of the court as an institution and its 
constitutional role in judicial review can be further illustrated in the recent change in judicial 
style in the United Kingdom (UK). As noted above, the English courts traditionally issue 
their judgments not in a collective, institutional tone.265 Instead, each judge delivers her 
“speech” while one of them would emerge as the main reference point for the legal issues 
concerned, serving as the de facto opinion of the court. Yet this centuries-old tradition seems 
to be changing in recent years. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC), which 
was inaugurated in 2009 to strengthen the British judicial power vis-à-vis the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,266 has moved away from its seriatim 
tradition to the practice of issuing its judgement in the form of a single majority opinion 
alongside separate opinions.267 Given the foregoing objective of the transfer of the House of 
Lords’ appellate jurisdiction to the UKSC and the quasi-constitutional review that the 
Human Rights Act of 1998 has brought about in the UK,268 the change in the UKSC’s 
                                                
262 KAHN, supra note 255, at 115. 
263 See id. at 209-29. 
264 Id. at 113-14. In the UK, judicial review refers to the control of the legality of administrative acts by the 
court. Acts of parliament are not subject to judicial review. For a discussion of judicial review in the UK, see 
T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 
183-210 (1994). 
265 Though there is no uniform requirement as to the judicial style in the UK, Dame Mary Arden notes that 
“there is a bias to seriatim judgments.” ARDEN, supra note 254, at 254; see also POPKIN, supra note 255, at 10 
(noting the English tradition of seriatim judgments in common law alongside the practice of issuing unanimous 
opinions by the Privy Council in the nineteenth century). 
266 See CHARLES BANNER & ALEXANDER DEANE, OFF WITH THEIR WIGS! JUDICIAL REVOLUTION IN 
MODERN BRITAIN11, 25-35 (2003) (discussing the concerns raised over the ambiguous status of the House of 
Lords after the UK’s incorporation of the ECHR); cf. Owen Bowcott, European Court Is Not Superior to UK 
Supreme Court, Says Lord Judge, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/04/european-court-uk-supreme-lord-judge (reporting on the former 
Lord Chief Justice Lord Judge’s extra-judicial remarks to the effect that the Strasbourg Court is not superior to 
the UKSC).  
267 Cf. POPKIN, supra note 255, at 31-32, 41-42 (discussing the emergence of de facto opinion of the court 
before the creation of the UKSC). 
268 See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS 
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judicial style should not be taken lightly. Rather, its meaning needs to be read in light of the 
greater British constitutional context in which the judicial power is on the rise vis-à-vis the 
privileged status of the British parliament under the British constitutional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.269 To be a constitutional power that can make its judgment in the 
face of the omnipotent legislature as well as the parliament-supported administration, the 
UKSC needs to make itself heard as an institution, a goal of which the seriatim tradition has 
fallen short.270 A collective voice in the form of a single majority opinion of the court gives 
the UKSC the added authority, which was found lacking in the speeches of the individual 
Law Lords of the previous Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. 
If the recent emergence of majority opinions in the UKSC rulings in judicial style 
testifies to the importance to the court of giving an institutional opinion on constitutional 
issues in its judicial capacity, the increase of separate opinions in the SCOTUS’ decisions 
inevitably casts doubt on its constitutional role in judicial review.271 It is true that a 
constitutional issue, especially a hard case, may not command a uniform answer to it, not to 
mention a single reasoning or opinion about the judgment.272 With society growing more 
diverse, consensus is even more elusive in hard constitutional cases.273 Giving separate 
opinions enables the court to reflect the diverse opinions of society, bringing the judicial 
                                                                                                                                                 
IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49-51 (2009) (suggesting the transformation of the British weak-form 
judicial review into hardened constitutional review) ; Ming-Sung Kuo, Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is 
Judicial Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?, 26 Can. J. L. & 
Juris. 341, 350 (2013). 
269 One of the most important developments is the distinction that the House of Lords drew between 
“constitutional statutes” and other acts of parliament in Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council ([2003] QB 151), 
to which the UKSC has adhered. As regards the former, the implications of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty have been curtailed. For further discussion on the development of constitutional statutes, see Farrah 
Ahmed & Adam Perry, Constitutional Statutes, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (2017). 
270 See also ARDEN, supra note 254, at 254-55 (suggesting that the UKSC follow other supreme courts 
across the world to depart from the tradition of seriatim judgments to a single majority opinion as it was created 
to replace the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords).  
271 See Thomas B. Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. __ (2017) (forthcoming) (identifying the increasing tide of separate opinions).  
272 See TUSHNET, supra note 268, at 50-51 (discussing “the myth of objective rights”); cf. James Q. 
Whitman, No Right Answer?, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMĂSKA 371, 373-79 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008) 
(discussing the mentality towards a definitive, correct answer to the law in the Civil Law tradition). 
273 See Frank I. Michelman, The Problem of Constitutional Interpretive Disagreement: Can “Discourses of 
Application” Help?, in HABERMAS AND PRAGMATISM 113 (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the 
relationship between constitutional judgment and interpretive disagreement). 
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deliberation closer to the public debate.274 Notably, these have been the reasons put forward 
in support of the British tradition of seriatim opinions.275 Nevertheless, the SCOTUS’ 
distinctive majoritarian decision-making pattern makes the increase of separate opinions in 
its rulings look more like the result of political decisions than judicial deliberation.276  
As Professor Jeremy Waldron rightly points out, judicial review is political since the 
multimember court needs to appeal to voting as the last resort to end its deliberation.277 In 
the final analysis, judicial rulings are no less majoritarian than political decisions.278 On the 
theoretical level, it looks as if to apply to judicial review around the globe. Yet, when he 
argues for comparative law in judicial decisionmaking, Professor Waldron acknowledges 
that what judicial decisions have in common in the world is that they pivot on the shared 
pattern of legal reasoning among legal professionals.279 Thus, in practice, voting in judicial 
decisionmaking seems to be not so much a tie breaker as the culmination of a process of 
persuasion. 280  From this perspective, the SCOTUS is the outlier in comparative 
constitutional studies as its vote tally usually comes down on five vs. four in its most 
contentious cases, suggesting that its decisions on constitutional issues have been taken on a 
purely majoritarian basis.281 It is together with the hardening of the five-four voting trend in 
hard cases that the separate opinions in the SCOTUS recent landmark rulings hardly speak to 
the reasonable disagreement among Justices as to those complex legal and constitutional 
issues. Rather, they appear to reflect the political infighting of a court divided along 
ideological lines, although it is fought in the name of the Constitution.282 For this reason, the 
                                                
274 LASSER, supra note 164, at 338-47; Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme 
Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 804 (2015). 
275 For further discussion on the reasons for the seriatim tradition in the UK, see ARDEN, supra note 254, at 
252. 
276 Joseph P. Nadeau, Dissents Undermine the Highest Court, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 2012, Op-ed; see 
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277 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1357-58, 
1395-1401 (2006). 
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279 WALDRON, supra note 176, at 94-108.  
280 KAHN, supra note 174, at 5-6. 
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21-27 (2010). 
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SCOTUS’ 2016 term was even highlighted as record-setting for “a level of agreement 
unseen at the court in more than 70 years,” which was attributed to the “unusual and 
awkward” vacancy left by the sudden death of Justice Anthony Scalia.283 If the SCOTUS 
turns out to be as political as it is, there is no reason to grant it the power of judicial review 
given that “the province and duty of the judicial department” is only “to say what the law 
is.”284  To say what the law is, the SCOTUS is expected to act as a judicial department, not 
a political power. Through this lens, the increasing frequency of five-four decisions of the 
SCOTUS and the corresponding growth of separate opinions should be watched with 
concerns as they seem to damage its authority and legitimacy.285 
Against the backdrop of the current divided court, the unanimity of the Brown Court is 
even more remarkable. Though the ongoing trend of five-four decisions is considered to be 
corrosive of the legitimacy of the SCOTUS, it does not mean that prior to the Bork 
moment,286 the SCOTUS rarely issued rulings accompanied by separate opinions.287 Rather, 
the issuance of separate opinions is taken as what has set the SCOTUS from other supreme 
sourts in comparative law.288 Even so, in a landmark decision of Brown’s magnitude, which 
bears enormously on virtually every sector of the society, a unanimous voice is considered 
essential to the firming of judicial reasoning.289 Amidst such a momentous decision, even a 
                                                
283 Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2017, at A16.  
284 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. See also id. at 170 (“The province of the court is, solely, to decide on 
the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive, can never be made in this court.”). 
285 See James R. Zink et al., Courting the Public: The Influence of Decision: Attributes on Individuals’ 
Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909 (2009) (discussing the relationship between the public acceptance of 
the SCOTUS decisions and the size of the deciding majority); but cf. Sunstein, supra note 274, at 802-15 
(suggesting that the SCOTUS has been a plurivocal court since 1941).  
286 President Reagan’s nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the SCOTUS and its rejection by the Senate is 
regarded as the watershed in judicial appointments, politicizing the confirmation process. See CHARLES 
GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY (2016); 
see also Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 YALE L.J. 1164, 1164-65 (1988).  
287 See Sunstein, supra note 274, at 773-84 (discussing the spiking of separate opinion in the SCOTUS case 
law after 1941). 
288 See LASSER, supra note 164, at 64 (including the drafting and publication of concurring and dissenting 
opinions as one of the stylistic characteristics of the SCOTUS decision).  
289 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 
1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1979); see also Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown 
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concurring opinion may be used to weaken the authority of the SCOTUS’ ruling. By virtue 
of providing a competing argument, a concurring opinion could create the impression that 
the milestone decision that the SCOTUS delivers is more of a jump of logic than a result of 
legal reasoning.290 To be sure, this may not be the intended effect of the Justices who issue 
their independent judgments alongside the majority’s but their bona fide opinions may still 
affect how the opinion of the court would be seen in the public eye when it comes to a 
historic ruling. Such concern about the authority of the desegregation decision and its effect 
on the legitimacy of the SCOTUS has made the managed unanimity of the Brown decision 
under Chief Justice Earl Warren’s leadership notable at the time of its issuance and even 
more admirable in hindsight.291 
Apparently the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case is not Brown and the TCC is not 
the SCOTUS. Unlike the unanimous Brown decision, the Same-Sex Marriage Case is 
accompanied by two separate opinions: one dissenting and another separate opinion formally 
concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the opinion of the TCC.292 Even so, in light of 
the evolution of the TCC’s style reversing the track path of the SCOTUS’, that the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case has only two separate opinions is not only unusual but also awkward as we 
shall show, suggesting a certain parallelism with the managed unanimity of the Brown 
decision.  
In contrast to the SCOTUS’ move from the common law tradition of seriatim 
judgments to the establishment of the opinion of the court in its early history, the TCC 
adhered to its Civil Law tradition in judicial style when it was inaugurated in 1948. Before 
the enactment of the first legislation governing the TCC procedures in 1958, the TCC issued 
                                                                                                                                                 
v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1872-73 (1991) (discussing the centrality of unanimity in 
Justice Frankfurter’s approach to Brown).  
290 See Bennett et al., supra note 271 (“[c]ommentators are virtually uniform in contempt for  
Concurrences” for their erosion of legal authority); see also John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: 
Tragic Choices?, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 240 (2000); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Writing 
Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 148 (1990). 
291 KLARMAN, supra note 210, at 301-08; see also KAHN, supra note 255, at 115; Law, supra note 215, at 
778. 
292 Justice Chen-Huan Wu issues the dissenting. Though Justice Horng-Shya Huang delivers her separate 
opinion in the form of partly concurring and partly dissenting, hers amounts to be a dissenting opinion in 
essence. We shall come back to Justices Wu’s and Huang’s separate opinions later.  
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Interpretations in a French-style judicial ruling according to its own bylaw:293 judicial 
rulings were delivered in a decree-like, formalistic, abstract, single judgment with no 
distinction being made between the holding and the ratio decidendi.294 During this period, 
all the seventy-nine Interpretations were rendered with a collective voice unaccompanied by 
any separate opinions. This institutionalized single opinion in judicial practice changed with 
the enactment of the Council of Grand Justices Act in 1958. The 1958 legislation not only 
reorganized an Interpretation into a holding and a ratio decidendi but also allowed the TCC 
Justices to issue dissenting opinions. That was a historic change in terms of the long-held 
Civil Law tradition in Taiwan. Interpretation No. 80,295 the first Interpretation rendered post 
the 1958 legislation, was issued with an unprecedented dissenting opinion. Yet, despite the 
statutory change, its impact on judicial style was negligible. From 1958 to February 03, 1993 
when the 1958 legislation was replaced by the current CIPA and concurring opinions were 
thereby introduced alongside dissenting, the TCC issued 233 Interpretations (Interpretation 
Nos. 80--312). Out of the 233 Interpretations issued in this period, 133 were accompanied by 
at least one separate (i.e., dissenting) opinion.296 Specifically, 203 separate opinions in total 
were issued and the average number of separate opinions in each Interpretation was 0.87. In 
other words, the 1958 legislation did not change the judicial style fundamentally as the TCC 
appeared to continue upholding its Civil Law legacy of speaking with one voice. 
The enactment of the new CIPA in 1993 did not change this pattern either, at least, in 
its first ten years. From its enactment to September, 2003 when the appointment of the TCC 
Justices fundamentally changed as a result of the constitutional amendment of 1997,297 the 
TCC issued 254 Interpretations (Interpretation Nos. 313—566). 124 out of those 254 
Interpretations had at least one separate opinion (regardless of whether it was concurring or 
                                                
293 See supra note 229. 
294 See Chang, supra note 128, at 672. 
295 Interpretation No. 80 (1958), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=80 
(English translation). 
296 For present purposes, a separate opinion with multiple authors is counted once. Our analysis, coding, 
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dissenting). During this period there were 234 separate opinions in total (with concurring and 
dissenting combined), while the average number of separate opinions in each Interpretation 
was 0.92. Though the average increased slightly, the judicial style in general remained 
unchanged as the TCC adhered to its tradition of avoiding separate opinions.298  
Yet the TCC has seen a sea change in judicial style since Interpretation No. 567 when 
the new TCC Justices appointed for staggered eight-year terms issued their first 
Interpretation in October, 2003. Since then, the TCC has issued 182 Interpretations (Nos. 
567-752),299 153 of which have come with at least one separate opinion. With 755 separate 
opinions in total issued, the average number of separate opinions in each Interpretation 
soared from less than 1 of the previous period to 4.15 during this period. More important, 
since Interpretation No. 675 of April 09, 2010, the TCC has never issued a unanimous 
decision. In this post-unanimity era, 542 separate opinions have been issued in 78 
Interpretations, pushing the average number of separate opinions in each Interpretation up to 
6.95. In sum, the TCC has departed from its Civil Law pedigree of speaking with a collective 
voice for a plurivocal court. 
Against the recent cacophonic rendering of its decisions, the TCC’s delivery of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case accompanied by only two separate opinions is noteworthy. Still, a 
prior question needs to be answered: Is the deviation from the recent plurivocal 
decisionmaking pattern in the number of separate opinions in the Same-Sex Marriage Case a 
natural result of the newly packed court or the managed product of the TCC itself? As noted 
in Part II, the TCC Justices personally drove the same-sex marriage issue to the forefront of 
the political agenda during their confirmation hearings in 2016.300 Seen in this light, the 
exceptional decrease in the separate opinions of the Same-Sex Marriage Case may be 
                                                
298 Notably, Interpretation No. 520 issued on January 15, 2001 had nine separate opinions, which made it an 
outlier in this period. This is understandable as it concerned a political drama involving complex 
denuclearization policies and convoluted partisan struggles. Interpretation No. 520 (2001), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=520 (English translation). For details 
about the background of Interpretation No. 520, see Kuo, supra note 12, at 609-12. 
299 The last TCC Interpretation considered in this Article is Interpretation No. 752, which was announced on 
July 28, 2017. It is also the last ruling made by the TCC before it entered its annual month-long recess in 
August.  
300 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68. 
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explained as a result of the change of the composition of the TCC. Upon closer examination, 
however, this proposition does not hold water. Since the new Justices assumed office in 
November 2016, the TCC has rendered 12 Interpretations (Nos. 741-752). Instead of 
changing course, the TCC has continued the plurivocal pattern set out in Interpretation No. 
675 with no unanimous ruling ever being issued since November, 2016. In this period, the 
TCC has published 91 separate opinions with the average number of separate opinions in 
each of the 12 Interpretations reaching as high as 7.58. Thus, the change in composition does 
not explain the exceptionally few (only two) separate opinions alongside the Opinion of the 
Court in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Moreover, after the Same-Sex Marriage Case is taken 
out of equation, the average number of separate opinions in the eleven Interpretations issued 
by the newly packed TCC is 8.09. All in all, that the Same-Sex Marriage Case has only two 
separate opinions is unusual. 
That the Same-Sex Marriage Case coming with only two separate opinions is unusual is 
borne out by the stark contrast between it and the recent trend in the style of the TCC rulings. 
But being unusual is not necessarily awkward. How can we say that it is awkward that the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is accompanied by only two separate opinions? Let us start telling 
the story about awkwardness with the separate opinions themselves. As suggested above, the 
two separate opinions accompanying the Same-Sex Marriage Case are one dissenting 
opinion authored by Justice Chen-Huan Wu and another by Justice Horng-Shya Huang by 
virtue of which she concurs in part and dissents in part as to the Opinion of the Court.301 
Justice Wu’s opinion is dissenting in form and substance indeed. Yet a closer read of Justice 
Huang’s opinion tells us that it is (partly) concurring only in name. Rather, Justice Huang 
dissents from the majority not only about the reasoning but also about the result in entirety. 
In other words, there are effectively two dissenting opinions in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. 
The fact alone that one of them was disguised as a partly concurring opinion is awkward 
enough.302  
                                                
301 See supra text accompanying note 292. 
302 To be fair, it is the TCC practice that the formal designation of separate opinions as concurring or 
dissenting may not correspond to their substance.  
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Moreover, according to the available anecdotal evidence, the number of separate 
opinions in the Same-Sex Marriage Case does not tell the whole truth of the differing 
positons on the same-sex marriage issue within the TCC. It was reported that a number of 
Justices who voted against the TCC holding refrained from issuing their dissenting 
opinions.303 Anonymous sources also suggested that draft concurring opinions that would be 
more robust than the Opinion of the Court had indeed been circulated in the TCC. Yet they 
were withdrawn at the last minute as a negotiated concession to deflect wavering Justices 
from changing their minds in an effort to save the result of the Same-Sex Marriage Case.304 
Having only two separate opinions is awkward as it seems to hardly reflect the positions of 
the TCC Justices in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. 
In sum, having only two separate opinions in the Same-Sex Marriage Case is unusual 
and awkward in terms of the TCC’s current plurivocal style and its failure to indicate how 
individual Justices have approached the contentious issue of same-sex marriage. Yet it is 
unusual and awkward not in the negative sense.305 Instead, its unusualness and awkwardness 
throw the extraordinary character of the Same-Sex Marriage Case itself into sharp relief, 
regardless of whether and, if so, to what extent the anecdotal evidence has reflected the truth. 
Read together with its distinctive brevity and in light of the foregoing discussion on the 
importance of a unanimous judicial ruling in face of salient constitutional issues, the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case has managed to maintain its own authority by speaking with 
virtual unanimity instead of a cacophony of competing voices. Though the TCC still falls 
short of rendering a unanimous decision on the model of the Brown Court, the concern of the 
TCC Justices about the size of the majority was not without reason in view of the salience of 
the issue before it. Having only two separate opinions gives the TCC the veneer of a 
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quasi-consensual court to deflect the attacks on the legitimacy of its attempt to settle the 
politically charged issue of same-sex marriage. 
3. “Believing in the power of science as the deliverer of final truths”306 
Judge Richard Posner believes in the power of “methods of science” in the discovery of 
legal truths as alluded to in the above heading, despite his repudiation of the metaphysical 
“faith” in science as the “deliverer of final truths” in his effort to overcome the law as it is.307 
In his view, law must look to sources beyond itself scientifically to establish its authority in 
society. This reminds us of the epistemic uncertainty about the law and its complicated 
history with the legitimacy of judicial review. As Chief Justice Marshall suggested, the 
legitimacy of the SCOTUS’ power to invalidate Congressional legislation depends in large 
part on the traditional role of the judiciary in saying what the law is.308 Seen in this light, 
knowledge about the law is indispensable to the legitimate exercise of judicial review. Yet 
law’s uncertain epistemic character has repeatedly changed the face of the authority of the 
law that underlies the legitimacy of judicial decisions. 
Judge Posner’s external view of the law and its epistemic character as noted above 
seems to be natural in the current legal landscape populated with law and economics, 
empirical studies, and other competing scientific approaches to the law.309 Once upon a 
time, however, such view would have been held to be heretic as the law was seen as the 
expression of reason, if not reason itself.310 Under this earlier view, legal expertise was part 
of science as both knowledges were governed by reason.311 In medieval Europe, Roman law 
                                                
306 This is an adaption of Judge Posner’s discussion of science, law, and pragmatism. See RICHARD A. 
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was even considered the embodiment of reason while reading law was on a par with studies 
of medicine and other esteemed knowledges in the predecessors of modern research 
universities.312 That internal and scientific view of law and legal expertise was once held to 
be self-evident.  
Yet the centuries-old consensus on the relationship between law and science broke 
down at the turn of the twentieth-century, setting the two sides of the Atlantic on divergent 
paths in the development of law. It is true that Baron de Montesquieu’s monumental The 
Spirit of Laws313 has long been considered the pioneer of sociological studies of law.314 
Also European legal scholarship saw its own reformation in thinking about the authority and 
epistemic character of law in the second half of the nineteenth century.315 Nevertheless, 
despite the “free law” movement in the late nineteenth century, which put more emphasis on 
the role of interest than reason in the formation of the law, the tradition of scientific law, or 
rather legal science, has survived almost unscathed in Europe.316 While law continues to 
embody reason, legal expertise remains to be seen as part of science. 
In contrast, the development of the US law has been a winding quest for the scientific 
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character of law and the knowledge about it since it became an object of higher education.317 
At first the scientific character of the law was to be discovered within the law. Dean 
Christopher Langdell’s science of law embodied that idea.318 Yet Langdell’s dream of the 
law as a seamless web of doctrines and principles governed by reason and logic evaporated 
when exposed to the critical light of legal realists and their predecessors.319 From then on, 
judicial doctrines were judged as having failed to deliver on the scientific character it had 
longed for from within. As a result, law needs to look to the help from external sources, 
generating the successive reform movements in the US legal scholarship, including the social 
science of law during the New Deal and after, law and economics, and critical legal studies 
movement, legal feminism, and race theories of law, etc.320 Judge Posner, a child of the 
post-realist age, believes in the power of scientific methods in the discovery of legal truths.  
Notably, the development in the relationship between law and other disciplines in the 
twentieth century is not as straightforward as it seems. If law builds its authority on other 
disciplines of knowledge, what is the use of law? Shouldn’t cases be resolved in accordance 
with, say, economics rather than the law? In other words, turning to external sources of 
epistemic authority, the law may put its own autonomy and legitimacy in jeopardy.321 The 
notorious Lochner v. New York322provides a primary example. Lochner has been criticised 
for its failure to consider the contemporaneous socio-economic context in its dogmatic 
approach to the dubious doctrine of freedom of contract.323 Yet what made Lochner no less 
outrageous and illegitimate was the adoption of laissez faire economic philosophy and 
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319 Id. at 16-32 (discussing Langdell’s concept of law alongside its analogy to geometry and characteristics 
of circularity, precedent, and progress). 
320 See Calabresi, supra note 309; cf. Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Plicymakers: Yale Law School 
Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 75, 
103, 125 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004) (questioning the quality of social science-based legal arguments 
during the New Deal). 
321 See BOMHOFF, supra note 316, at 36 (noting law’s emphasis on autonomy). 
322 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
323 Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contract and the “Political Economy” of Lochner v. New York, 1 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 515, 519 (2005) (noting the conventional criticism that Lochner “mercurially” 
“invent[ed]” a “fictional” constitutional right to freedom of contract under the Due Process Clause). 
 67 
Herbert Spencer’s social Darwinism in its constitutional reasoning.324 Viewed thus, the 
Lochner Court abandoned the law for ideology, if you will.325  
Only in light of the foregoing bumpy relations between law and other disciplines of 
knowledge can the significance of the Brown Court’s turn to sociology and psychology be 
duly appreciated. Despite its all-time great status, Brown has been criticized for simply 
declaring that “in the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place” without countering that infamous Plessy doctrine with a comprehensive legal 
argument of equal citizenship.326 Instead, Chief Justice Warren chose to engage with Justice 
Brown’s majority opinion in Plessy to the effect that the alleged “badge of inferiority” 
resulting from the separate but equal accommodations of blacks was nothing but a 
self-inflicting construction of their own choosing327 by appealing to social psychology in his 
opinion for the Brown Court. According to this conventional wisdom, Chief Justice Warren 
replaced legal expertise with social sciences in resolving the hard legal case of segregation in 
public education. Yet the real story about Brown’s turn to social psychology is more delicate 
and complex than the conventional wisdom holds.  
In his meticulous exposition of the civil rights revolution, Professor Bruce Ackerman 
manages to dissect Chief Justice Warren’s Opinion of the Court and recover what he calls 
“the lost logic of Brown v Board.”328 In Brown, he discerns a five-step approach, which 
offers the prototype of a sociological jurisprudence.329 According to Professor Ackerman, 
the Brown Court turned to sociological methods to define the nature of the problem without 
                                                
324 Joseph Frazier Wall, Social Darwinism and Constitutional Law with Special Reference to Lochner v. 
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326 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
327 In Justice Brown’s own words,  
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Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
328 ACKERMAN, supra note 150, at 129. 
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being straightjacketed by originalism, to refute the legalistic and simplistic classification of 
rights into political, civil, and social types and the doctrinal exclusive focus on the first two 
classes of rights, to emphasize the special status of public education, to explore the effect of 
segregation in public education, and finally to justify the role of social science in 
constitutional reasoning.330 What is of particular pertinence to our present discussion is the 
fourth and fifth steps in Brown’s social science-based approach to the constitutional question 
of segregation in public schools. In the fourth step where the effect of segregation in public 
education was explored, Brown tackled Plessy’s self-inflicted “badge of inferiority” 
proposition head-on. Countering Justice Brown’s self-inflicting construction theory, Chief 
Justice Warren responded, “To separate [black children] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”331 It is for these famous lines that Brown has been considered the epitome of 
sociological jurisprudence, appealing to social psychology to achieve the constitutional goal 
of setting the doctrine of “separate but equal” aside in the sphere of public education.  
Pace that conventional view, Professor Ackerman argues that in contrast to his first 
three moves, Chief Justice Warren broke no new methodological ground on this point.332 
Instead, he simply acted on what Professor Karl Llewellyn famously called 
“situation-sense”, i.e., common sense.333 In other words, the foregoing quote that has made 
Brown the prototype of sociological jurisprudence is not as social scientific as it seems. On 
the contrary, Chief Justice Warren appealed to the unscientific nation’s consciousness and 
the equally unscientific “situation-sense” of the judiciary for putting an end to the “feeling of 
inferiority” shared among blacks. Through Professor Ackerman’s lens, “[j]udicial 
situation-sense was enough” to take down the “badge of inferiority” that Jim Crow had 
affixed to blacks with the help of Plessy.334 
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To be clear, Chief Justice Warren did not end the SCOTUS’ repudiation of Plessy 
there. And Professor Ackerman knows it very well. Following the fourth step, Professor 
Ackerman observes that Chief Justice Warren continued to cite Kenneth Clark and other 
authorities in psychology at that time before concluding that “in the field of public education, 
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.” It is in this next move that Professor 
Ackerman finds the place of social sciences in Brown. So, what sets his read of Brown apart 
from the conventional wisdom?  
The point of Professor Ackerman’s step-by-step retracing of the reasoning of Brown is 
that the Brown Court repudiated Plessy on the basis of the factual finding that the feeling of 
inferiority was real, not the result of a self-inflicting construction. But that factual finding 
was attributed to judicial situation-sense, not the widely assumed sociological methods. To 
put it bluntly, it did not require a law degree to make sense of the humiliation effected on 
black children by educational segregation. Nor did it take a Ph.D. in education or psychology 
to see its detrimental effect on black children’s learning performance in schools. In light of 
common sense, Professor Ackerman argues, these factual findings were already clear in the 
public eye and the SCOTUS knew it.335 Nevertheless, the SCOTUS moved to “buttress[] its 
commonsense [sic] conclusions with the findings of social science.”336 In this light, it 
transpires that the famous citation to social sciences was not the lynchpin of Brown’s 
sociological jurisprudence as the conventional view suggests.337  Rather, Chief Justice 
Warren’s pre-conclusion tactical move to bring in psychological knowledge in Brown was 
meant to firm up the legitimacy of the SCOTUS in face of a salient and divisive 
constitutional case by relocating the authority of its decision onto more scientific grounds.338 
Decided in the post-New Deal era when social sciences had penetrated into the epistemic 
realm of law, Brown reflected the continuing effort to maintain the authority of the law by 
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redefining its epistemic character.339  
It is beyond our present purposes to judge whether Brown’s choice to base a 
constitutional/ legal judgment on factual findings was successful or deceitful.340 Nor is it our 
intention to determine whether the social sciences that Chief Justice Warren invoked was 
sophisticated or half-baked.341 Yet our foregoing analysis of Brown suggests that confronted 
with a Brown-like contentious case, courts may follow in Chief Justice Warren’s footsteps to 
pivot constitutional judgment on factual findings and thus turn to nonlegal authority 
(including social sciences) to buttress their authority and legitimacy. Empirical legal studies 
gain wide currency for this reason.342 Moreover, this has not only manifested itself in the US 
legal landscape since Brown but is also true of the recent developments in Europe.343 And 
Taiwan, the TCC included, has not escaped from this empirical and factual turn in 
constitutional decisions, either. 
As the TCC case law indicates, social sciences and other nonlegal authority are “rarely 
considered” by the TCC.344 Also, there is no consensus among scholars as to the role of 
nonlegal authority in the TCC decisionmaking. In one of those rare cases, the TCC upheld 
the statutory total ban on ex-convicts of murder, serious sex offences, and other felonious 
crimes working as taxi drivers based on the statistics indicating high recidivism rates on 
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those crimes.345 Yet it provoked an academic debate as to the role of factual findings and 
empirical evidence in constitutional interpretation.346 Moreover, it is not easy to tell from 
Interpretations whether the TCC actually invoked nonlegal authority. The TCC has never 
provided any footnote or endnote in its interpretations apart from the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case. To be clear, this peculiarity in judicial style does not suggest that the TCC never 
acknowledged the source of nonlegal authority in those rare cases in which it did look 
beyond legal authority. The TCC has referenced the source of authority, legal as well as 
nonlegal, from time to time in the body text of the ratio decidendi. Yet, juxtaposed with the 
decades-old un-footnoted judicial style and the uncertainty about the status of nonlegal 
authority in constitutional judgment, the unprecedented addition of three endnotes to the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case alone speaks volumes about the value of the authority therein in 
the eyes of the TCC Justices. 
As noted above, the TCC includes three lengthy endnotes in the ratio decidendi of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case, which totals over 900 words, nearly as long as 17% of the ratio 
decidendi (excluding the endnotes).347 The puzzle is that the TCC does not elaborate on 
legal details in those three endnotes. Nor does it use the endnotes to buttress its argument. 
Instead, in the three lengthy and sometimes repetitious endnotes are the recap of the reports 
of international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the Pan American 
Health Organization, and various professional bodies at home and abroad to the effect that 
sexual orientation is immutable and homosexuality is not a disease.348 Without expertise in 
psychology or psychiatry, the TCC does not cite the foregoing authorities to engage with 
them for the purpose of deliberation. Instead, the TCC invokes them as the source of 
                                                
345 Interpretation No. 584 (2004), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=584 (English translation). For a 
summary discussion on the TCC’s invocation of sociological and other nonlegal authority, see Chang, supra 
note 128, at 665-67. 
346 Compare Shu-Perng Hwang, Can Numbers Talk? The Status of Fact in Constitutional Review in Light of 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 584, 1 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 1 (2007) (article in Chinese with English title 
and abstract) (criticizing Interpretation No. 584 for its empirical approach), with Wen-Tsong Chiou, Facts 
Neglected: The Possible Role of Social Science in Legal Reasoning, 37 (2) N.T.U.L.J. 233 (2008) (article in 
Chinese with English title and abstract) (the opposite). 
347 The word count of the endnotes weighs in at 923. With the endnotes excluded, the ratio decidendi of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is 5,437 words long. 
348 Interpretation No.748, supra note 2, Notes1-3. 
 72 
authority as they are in support of its legal conclusion. As it turns out, the TCC looks to 
external, nonlegal authority to bolster the authority of its constitutional judgment. For this 
reason, Obergefell is cited as part of the expert evidence on psychiatry instead of a source of 
persuasive authority in the law.349  
The exceptional character of the unprecedented inclusion of endnotes in the ratio 
decidendi of the Same-Sex Marriage Case becomes clearer when juxtaposed with the TCC’s 
omission of any precedential authority or inspiration from comparative law sources. As 
noted in Part III, the TCC does not cite any of its own case law except to distinguish the 
issue of same-sex marriage from the past cases.350 Failure to build on the authority of legal 
precedents puts the judicial decision at a precarious position.351 The TCC is not unaware of 
this risk but still carries on. Moreover, even if Obergefell exerts disproportionate influence 
on the TCC’s legal reasoning in the Same-Sex Marriage Case, the TCC deliberately leaves it 
out except referencing it among other psychological and medical authorities in the endnotes. 
To be fair, this may be explained by the convention of unattributed reference rooted in the 
TCC’s Civil Law pedigree. Yet the TCC did feel no constraint as it saw fit. For example, in 
its landmark decision to strike down the unconstitutional constitutional amendment of 2000, 
the TCC explicitly referred to a ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (Sentenza n.1146 of 
1988) to support its conclusion,352 even though Italian law had exerted virtually no influence 
on the legal practice or scholarship in Taiwan. Thus, just like its abandonment of its own 
case law, the TCC’s omission of comparative law inspiration in the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
is a deliberate choice rather than a logical conclusion of judicial style.  
Given the oversized influence of German jurisprudence on Taiwanese legal scholarship 
and the TCC case law,353 the missing of German constitutional jurisprudence in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case is even more surprising. The TCC does not leave the GFCC 
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jurisprudence out because it has said nothing about the same-sex marriage issue. Instead, the 
TCC omits it intentionally because it has said too much and repeatedly upheld the 
heterosexual-only marriage institution under German law. 354  The TCC knows this 
inconvenient truth only too well and thus decides to depart from its jurisprudential parents 
for other sources of authority.355 
It is also worth noting that when the TCC seeks authority for its judgment and finds its 
own case law and inspirations of comparative law insufficient to lend it the legal support, it 
also stays away from the decades-long “jurisgenerative” constitutional politics in regard to 
the gay rights movement and the recognition of same-sex marriage in Taiwan.356  Failing to 
tap into that abundant history as discussed in Part II and take account of the “constitutional 
canons” immanent in it with imaginativeness,357 the TCC comes to the awkward conclusion 
on the “insularity and discreteness” of gays and lesbians and their lack of power in the 
democratic order in the twenty-first-century Taiwan. Instead, it looks to nonlegal authority to 
establish the immutability of sexual orientation to pave the way for its awkward conclusion 
on the political status of gays and lesbians.  
Taken together, the TCC’s attitude towards its own case law, its reluctance to recognize 
the legal influence of Obergefell, and its lack of engagement with its traditional 
jurisprudential guide, the GFCC, as well as his ignorance of the jurisgenesis of decades-long 
gay rights movement in Taiwan suggest the TCC’s uneasiness about legal authority on 
same-sex marriage when it was called to make the constitutional decision with life-changing 
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implications to many people. When neither its own case law nor its main source of 
comparative law inspiration offers the authority that it needs to support its conclusion, the 
TCC simply turns to nonlegal expertise for what it cannot find in traditional legal authority. 
Departing for external, nonlegal authority, however, the TCC cannot claim itself the 
privileged status of specialist any more. In order to preserve its precarious position in face of 
the salient issue of same-sex marriage, the TCC thus attempts to compensate its truncated 
legal argument with long and even repetitious psychological and psychiatric references. 
Because of the exceptional length, the references are compelled to be separated from the 
body text in style, giving birth to the unprecedented three endnotes in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case. Echoing the Brown Court, the TCC’s addition of endnotes concerning 
psychological and psychiatric knowledge is a deliberate choice to build the authority of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case on scientific grounds other than legal doctrines.  
B. Judicial Legitimacy in the Limelight  
Brown brought the question of the legitimacy of judicial review to the fore in the US. 
Regardless of whether the Brown Court successfully dismantled Jim Crow or simply set the 
civil rights revolution in motion, the political reactions to the SCOTUS’ decision 
unquestionably rewrote the history of American constitutional law and politics.358 The 
SCOTUS has become the focus of constitutional politics since it turned from “the least 
dangerous branch of the federal government” into the most decisive voice in constitutional 
interpretation.359 In parallel to the political polemics surrounding Brown and the SCOTUS in 
general, various theories of judicial review have since been put forward to justify or question 
the legitimacy of judicial review. Brown has defined generations of constitutional 
scholarship from the second half of the twentieth century on, all of which are organized 
around the question of the legitimacy of judicial review with that historic decision in 
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mind.360 
It is too early to tell whether the Same-Sex Marriage Case will redefine the next 
generation of constitutional scholarship on the TCC in the same way as Brown did with 
respect to the SCOTUS. Yet the political reactions to the Same-Sex Marriage Case in 
Taiwan have been evocative of the post-Brown politics in the US. Though the National 
Administration, with the loud support of gay rights groups, has responded swiftly to the 
TCC’s ruling with a special task force in charge of the statutory overhaul required for the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, including the drafting of government bills on the 
amendment of social security, criminal law, and other legislation,361 opponents of same-sex 
marriage have also reacted vociferously without delay. Continuing their objection to 
same-sex marriage, churches and other religious groups have called for a national 
referendum aimed at overruling the TCC decision.362 Among them some Presbyterian 
churches, which won wide respect for their progressive role in the past political reforms, 
have issued statements condemning the TCC for its interference with the institution of 
marriage and family.363 Apart from the mobilization from religious and other civic groups, 
political forces have also intervened in the hopes of the Same-Sex Marriage Case being 
neutered. A county council has passed an extraordinary resolution, calling for the 
impeachment of the TCC Justices for the Same-Sex Marriage Case.364 Even Annett Lu, who 
                                                
360 See sources cited supra note 211. 
361 See Chen, supra note 250.  
362 Lawrence Chung, Taiwan Opponents of Gay Marriage Call for Referendum on Issue, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, May 25, 2017, available at 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2095653/taiwan-opponents-gay-marriage-call-referendum-iss
ue.  
363 Jin-Ni Chen (陳衿妮), Taiwan Ji Du Zhang Lao Jiao Hui Kaohsiung Zhong Hui, Tainan Zhong Hui Lian 
He Sheng Ming: Fan Dui Tong Xing Hun Yin He Fa Hua Nan Bu Taiwan Ji Du Jiao Zhang Lao Jiao Hui Jue 
Ding Zhan Kai “Ai Taiwan, Shou Hu Jia Ting” Yun Dong (台灣基督長老教會高雄中會、台南中會聯合聲明
: 反對同性婚姻合法化 南部台灣基督教長老教會決定展開「愛台灣、守護家庭」運動) [Joint Statement 
of the Kaohsiung and Tainan Presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “Against the Legalization of 
Same-Sex Marriage,” Presbyterian Churches in Southern Taiwan to Launch “Love Taiwan, Protect Family” 
Movement], Ji Du Jiao Jin Ri Bao (基督教今日報) [CHRISTIAN DAILY], June 3, 2017, 
http://www.cdn.org.tw/News.aspx?key=11319.  
364 Guo Xian Lin (林國賢), Yun-Lin Yi Hui Chen Qing Jian Yuan Yao Qiu Tan He Tong Hun Shi Xian Da 
Fa Guan (雲林議會陳情監院 要求彈劾同婚釋憲大法官) [Yun-Lin Council Petitioned the Control Yuan to 
Impeach the TCC Justices for the Same-Sex Marriage Case], LIBERTY TIME NET, June 23, 2017, 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2109610.  
 76 
served as Vice President in the DPP government from 2000 to 2008 and was a feminism and 
women’s rights trailblazer in Taiwan, has joined the chorus of criticism, accusing the TCC of 
overstepping the bounds of constitutional interpretation in striking down the 
heterosexual-only marriage institution under the current Taiwanese Civil Code.365 In the 
wake of the Same-Sex Marriage Case, the TCC seems to be denied the extensive social 
acceptance that it has consistently commanded for its past decisions, bringing the role of the 
TCC in the constitutional order and the question of judicial legitimacy in Taiwan into the 
limelight for the first time in history. 
This does not mean that the TCC was never challenged for its decisions before the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case. Nor does it suggest that the legitimacy of judicial review has been 
taken for granted since the TCC’s inauguration in 1948. The historical meaning of the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case to the legitimacy of judicial review needs to be read in light of the 
TCC’s changing role in the decades-long constitutional transformation in Taiwan. To tell the 
whole story about the TCC’s role in Taiwan’s metamorphosis from a quasi-military 
dictatorship into a constitutional democracy would make our long Article even longer.366 
Instead of turning the present Article into a monograph, we underline the characteristic 
features of the TCC, which are necessary to make sense of why the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
breaks new ground in the debate over the role of the TCC in Taiwanese constitutional law 
and politics. 
As we have noted in the beginning, the TCC had already existed way before 
constitutional democracy arrived in Taiwan. During that period, the TCC was anything but 
the constitution’s guardian. Instead, it stood as the institutional convenience to the political 
branches when they needed some constitutional cover for their positions.367 Its reputation 
was also tainted for it obediently granted the dictatorial regime the constitutional 
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endorsement for the unlimited prolongation of the three-year term of the 1948 Parliament.368 
Looking so unredeemable, however, the TCC conducted an unexpected exercise of 
constitutional bootstrapping that rebooted itself as the legitimate interpreter of constitutional 
principles when democratization and constitutional reform were already underway in the 
1980s.369 By means of the well-discussed Interpretation No. 261 of 1990, which ended the 
seemingly permanent 1948 Parliament and mandated new general elections to be held,370 the 
TCC not only provided a convenient constitutional exit for embattled reformists, both within 
and without the government, out of the political deadlock but also gave itself the legitimacy 
required of judicial review.371 Notably, Interpretation No. 261 exemplified the TCC being 
called upon to defuse the political crisis that could have nipped the democratic reform in the 
bud and brought down the whole political regime, setting the pattern for the TCC’s active 
intervention in constitutional issues concerning separation of powers. 
Notably, the TCC’s move towards becoming a robust power of judicial review was not 
without challenge, despite the extensive social acceptance that it has commanded following 
its helping role in the dismantlement of the fossilized 1948 Parliament. The foregoing pattern 
that has distinguished the TCC from other constitutional courts for its continuing 
involvement in separation of powers issues is equally revealing of the bumpy road that the 
TCC has taken when playing its constitutional role. As has been well discussed in 
constitutional scholarship, courts have the least political capital and their role is most limited 
when it comes to the judicial review of separation of powers issues.372 The TCC’s struggle 
to settle divisive political disputes and its powerlessness vis-à-vis the noncooperation from 
other constitutional powers after 2000 indicated the limitation of its effort to continue to 
resolve the lingering political deadlock among differing constitutional powers and rivaling 
                                                
368 Interpretation No. 31 (1954), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=31 
(English translation). 
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political forces.373 The challenges that the TCC has encountered apparently bear out the 
theory. 
Yet a careful read of the TCC’s post-2000 record suggests that the challenges with 
which the TCC was confronted during that period was more a consequence of high 
“partyism” than a reflection of general doubt about its legitimacy.374 To the extent that 
judicial review can only function properly under certain political conditions,375 the TCC’s 
post-2000 incompetence mirrored the breakdown of the political condition needed for its 
proper function rather than its failure on the legitimacy test. Despite the pathetic partisanship 
and the defiance from the losing side in constitutional disputes,376 the TCC did not face 
massive protests for its interpretations in that period. The political turmoil into which the 
TCC was thrown after 2000 instead suggests that judicial review cannot sustain on its own 
terms.377 Moreover, the 2016 Parliament’s obedient suspension of its legislative process on 
the bills of same-sex marriage until the TCC’s decision testified to the overall support of the 
TCC’s role as the authoritative interpreter of constitutional principles.378 In sum, the 
sixteen-year incompetence post 2000 posed political challenges to the TCC but barely shook 
its legitimacy in constitutional interpretation.379 
Apart from the TCC’s role in the unsettling area of separation of powers, another point 
that should be considered in making sense of the law and politics of the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case is its role in the protection of fundamental rights. Though the TCC has presented a 
remarkable record on a wide range of rights issues from criminal justice to freedom of 
speech to data privacy to gender equality to land rights since its bootstrapping exercise in the 
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early 1990s,380 its case law in this area rarely generated heated debates beyond the small 
circles of legal professionals or special interested parties. For this reason, the TCC seems to 
have deviated from the pattern of other courts in new democracies where the judicialization 
of politics has resulted in the politicization of judicial review as the judicial power intervened 
in political issues mainly through the constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights.381 
Having said that, we do not suggest that the TCC’s intervention in fundamental rights issues 
generated no controversies. For example, the TCC’s decision to strip public prosecutors of 
the power of pre-trial detention was vehemently opposed by the Ministry of Justice as well 
as other law enforcement agencies and invited the criticism that the TCC paid no heed to the 
needs of law and order and the decades-old judicial proceedings with its literalist 
interpretation of the constitution.382 The TCC’s invalidation of the statutory provision for the 
mandatory submission of fingerprints as a precondition for the replacement of national ID 
cards was another example.383 Again the TCC was accused of expanding the protection of 
the unenumerated right to privacy at the expense of the needs of the modern society in the 
prevention of crimes. 384  Nevertheless, neither decision prompted street protests or 
reactionary vitriol. Nor did other TCC decisions concerning fundamental rights. This record 
proves the extensive acceptance of the TCC’s role in issues concerning fundamental rights. 
Moreover, if we take into consideration the fact that judicial review is most directly 
connected to the people’s life through its decisions on fundamental rights,385 the enduring 
respect that the TCC has possessed in post-authoritarian Taiwan for its interpretation of 
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fundamental rights provides the sociological evidence of its legitimacy in constitutional 
interpretation.386    
Taken as a whole, it is fair to characterize the TCC as a robust power of judicial review 
with broad support or as a legitimate and effective dispute-settlement mechanism except 
during the sixteen years of hyper partyism in the twenty-first century. If our characterization 
is correct, the post-ruling reaction to the Same-Sex Marriage Case suggests something that 
merits close attention. As noted above, the Same-Sex Marriage Case has provoked raucous 
protests from groups of different political persuasions.387 In contrast to the attacks and 
boycotts with which the TCC was afflicted during the 2000-16 period, however, the criticism 
that the TCC has suffered in the wake of the Same-Sex Marriage Case does not emerge 
along party lines. Rather, it transcends the traditional political rivalry, bringing the TCC’s 
intervention in the institution of marriage and family to the forefront of the law and politics 
surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage.  
Also, the fact alone that the issue of fundamental rights came front and center in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case makes the unprecedented grievous reaction to the TCC’s decision 
even more disquieting. If judgments on fundamental rights provide the link between judicial 
review and the people, the reactions that they generate are the litmus test of the extent of 
acceptance that the power of judicial review receives for its constitutional role in society. In 
this light, the post-ruling politics of the Same-Sex Marriage Case can be seen as the sign of 
the TCC’s struggling to win wide-ranging support for its robust intervention in a 
fundamental rights issue. In sum, the Same-Sex Marriage Case brings the TCC into line with 
other courts in new democracies to the extent that it exposes the judicialization of politics 
through fundamental rights to public scrutiny. 
To repeat, it is too early to tell how the post-ruling politics of the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case will have played out in the legalization of same-sex marriage and in which direction it 
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will move the future of the TCC in the constitutional order. Also we have stopped short of 
suggesting that the Same-Sex Marriage Case has thrown the TCC into a legitimacy crisis. 
Yet, in terms of the unprecedented reactions, the Same-Sex Marriage Case does bring the 
question of judicial legitimacy and the TCC’s role in the society into the limelight for the 
first time in its post-authoritarian history. Mirroring Brown in this sense, the Same-Sex 
Marriage Case marks the TCC’s Brown, not Obergefell, moment.        
V. CONCLUSION 
“[J]udicial review cannot, in the long run, operate effectively unless there is general 
popular acceptance of [it],” commented Professor Arthur von Mehren in 1952 in the wake of 
the first substantive ruling issued by the then nascent GFCC when Germany was still 
struggling to rebuild itself after the Second World War.388 This was not only true of the 
GFCC in its infancy but remains true when it has grown into a giant in comparative 
constitutional law and politics. So is it of the TCC and any institution of judicial review in 
the world. And, with the issuance of the Same-Sex Marriage Case, it comes time to examine 
whether the TCC can continue to possess the general popular acceptance for its momentous 
decision. That is why we have conducted a microscopic examination of the law and politics 
of the Same-Sex Marriage Case.   
In this Article, we have first situated the Same-Sex Marriage Case in the larger context 
of the social movement for the recognition of same-sex marriage in Taiwan. What is 
distinctive about the Same-Sex Marriage Case is the discrepancy between law and politics in 
the pursuit for the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians in Taiwan. Politically, the rise of 
same-sex marriage to the top of the antidiscrimination agenda resulted from the continuous 
effort of gay rights activists that has paralleled the democratic movement. In contrast, the 
TCC watched the gay rights movement from the sidelines without intervening in it with legal 
guidance until the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Acutely aware of the constitution’s silence on 
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gay rights for too long, the newly-packed TCC was determined to intervene in the issues 
concerning the rights of gays and lesbians by taking on the fundamental question of 
same-sex marriage with doctrinal insight and style skills. 
With the distinctive discrepancy between the law and politics of same-sex marriage in 
mind, we further read the Same-Sex Marriage Case closely in light of American 
constitutional jurisprudence. The subject (same-sex-marriage) and the way to legalize it 
(judicial review) naturally draw the attention of students of constitutional law to the 
comparison of the TCC’s Same-Sex-Marriage Case and the SCOTUS’ Obergefell. 
Juxtaposing both cases in terms of doctrine and principle, we agree that a certain parallelism 
exists between the Same-Sex Marriage Case and Obergefell. Yet we have also found that the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case not only mirrors Obergefell itself but also reflects the Greater 
Obergefell jurisprudence on the right to equal liberty, which has built on a series of the 
SCOTUS judgments on the rights of gays and lesbians since Lawrence. In other words, to 
address the discrepancy between the law and politics in the constitutional protection of gay 
rights, the TCC manages to accomplish in the Same-Sex Marriage Case what it has taken the 
SCOTUS a whole line of the case law and over a decade to achieve.389 It is here that the 
parallelism ends between the Same-Sex Marriage Case and Obergefell. And it is for that 
discrepancy that the Same-Sex Marriage Case has prompted the public rancor that 
Obergefell has barely seen,390 bringing itself closer to Brown.  
Shifting attention to judicial style, we have found that the Same-Sex Marriage Case and 
Brown are comparable in terms of their managed brevity, virtual unanimity, and reliance on 
nonlegal authority. Judging by its own conventional practice, we argue that the TCC does not 
issue the relatively brief Same-Sex Marriage Case with the support of scientific authority 
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and including only two separate opinions by accident. Those features were part of the law 
and politics of the Same-Sex Marriage Case, which had been preconditioned by its political 
(pre)history, as they were meant to maintain the public support of the TCC after the decision. 
Compared to the past turmoil that the TCC ever experienced in its post-authoritarian history 
and given the centrality of fundamental rights in this ruling, the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
marks the TCC’s Brown moment when its legitimacy has been brought into the limelight by 
the post-ruling politics.     
Following his perceptive comment on the GFCC as quoted in the beginning of this Part, 
Professor von Mehren noted that the GFCC’s “skill, insight, and determination” exerted 
substantial influence on the popular general acceptance of its role in a constitutional 
democracy.391 That proposition applied to the infant GFCC and still applies when it is about 
to enter its seventies. So does it apply to the TCC and the SCOTUS. The concern over 
general popular acceptance is embodied in the judicial style of the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
as the TCC was bracing itself for its Brown moment when the decision was still in the 
making. Both the TCC and the SCOTUS have shown their insight and determination in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case and Brown, respectively. Whether the TCC will achieve of what 
the Brown Court fell short and maintain the general popular support that it has habitually 
commanded with the skillful maneuvering of judicial style after the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case remains to be seen. 
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